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This systematic review synthesises evidence of how people use the Internet to deploy covert 
strategies around escaping from, or perpetrating, Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). Online tools 
and services can facilitate individuals leaving abusive relationships, yet they can also act as a 
barrier to departure. They may also enable abusive behaviours. A comprehensive literature 
search of published and unpublished studies in electronic databases was conducted. Two 
researchers independently screened abstracts and full-texts for study eligibility and evaluated 
the quality of included studies. The systematic review includes 22 studies (9 qualitative and 11 
cross-sectional studies, a Randomized control trial and a Non-randomized study), published 
between 2004 and 2017. Four covert behaviours linked to covert online strategies around IPV 
were identified: presence online, granular control, use of digital support tools and services, 
stalking and surveillance. The same technology that provides individuals with easy access to 
information and supportive services related to IPV, such as digital devices, tools and services, 
also enables perpetrators to monitor or harass their partners. This review takes a rigorous 
interdisciplinary approach to synthesising knowledge on the covert strategies adopted by people 
in relation to IPV. It has particular relevance to practitioners who support survivors in 
increasing awareness of the role of digital technologies in IPV, to law enforcement agencies in 
identifying new forms of evidence of abuse, and in enabling designers of online/social media 
applications to take the needs and vulnerabilities of IPV survivors into account. 
Keywords: Intimate partner violence, Covert behaviours, Social networking sites, Digital 
technologies, interpersonal electronic surveillance  
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Introduction 
This paper reports on an interdisciplinary systematic review conducted to identify the covert 
strategies deployed online by individuals involved in Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), either 
perpetrators or survivors, and the enablers and barriers encountered in using these strategies. 
The research was carried out as part of the Keeping Secrets Online project 
(crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/keeping-secrets-online/), which synthesises new knowledge of 
how people use the Internet to facilitate secret-keeping in a range of contexts.  
The topic of experiencing or perpetrating Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) was selected as a rich 
area of study as there is a high level of motivation for people to keep secrets online in this 
context. Intimate Partner Violence is defined as any behaviour within an intimate relationship 
that causes physical, psychological or sexual harm to those in the relationship (Krug, Dahlberg, 
Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano, 2002). A victim1 may seek support online in coping with IPV, or 
assistance and advice in escaping from it. If the perpetrator discovers their activities, the victim 
may be at risk of physical and psychological harm from the perpetrator, or the victim may be 
deterred from escaping from the abusive relationship. Technology-based IPV creates emotional 
turmoil, life complications, and helplessness, especially in women’s lives (Brown, Reed, & 
Messing, 2018).  
Victims/ Survivors of IPV 
Women aged 18–29 are at higher risk of IPV than older women (Bradley & Potter, 2018; Brown 
et al., 2018). Although some studies describe equal rates of IPV perpetration across genders, or 
imply that women more often perpetrate some forms of IPV, researchers adopting feminist 
                                               
1 Throughout this paper, we apply gender-specific terms only where they originate in the papers included in our 
review, to accurately reflect research content.  
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epistemological approaches emphasize the importance of looking at the context and 
consequences around IPV before concluding that there is gender symmetry (Brown et al., 2018). 
There have been attempts made to educate those either experiencing or at risk of IPV 
about Internet safety (Finn & Atkinson, 2009), and to deliver online interventions that aim to 
reduce their risk. Online interventions include the use of Internet-based safety decision aids and 
action plans, which can be accessed through smartphones, tablets and computers (Bloom et al., 
2014; Eden et al., 2015; Ford-Gilboe et al., 2017; Koziol-McLain et al., 2015; Tarzia et al., 
2016; Wathen & McKeown, 2010). Victims and survivors can access online tools that help 
increase privacy and safety, whilst online fora can support their emotional and psychological 
recovery (Brem et al., 2017; Jenaroa, Floresa, & Fríasb, 2018; Lee & Anderson, 2016; 
Marganski & Melander, 2018; Melander, 2010; Southworth, Finn, Dawson, Fraser, & Tucker, 
2007).  
In this systematic review, we sought to identify and synthesise the strategies used by 
individuals who had experienced any form of IPV (including physical violence, coercive 
control, cyberstalking) and had engaged in covert online behaviours when attempting to leave 
a relationship. This included generating a new identity or concealing an old identity online. We 
also considered how online tools and services serve as a means of extending abusive behaviours 
by the perpetrator. 
Perpetrators  
Perpetrators’ efforts to exert power and control by frightening, stalking, monitoring and 
controlling their victims have been enabled by a wide range of technological tools. These tools 
range  from early innovations such as caller identification, fax machines, calling cards, and 
cordless telephones to more contemporary ones such as cellular and wireless telephones, GPS 
and location services, spyware software and keystroke login hardware, and hidden cameras (Al-
Alosi, 2017; Melander, 2010; Southworth et al., 2007). Social networking sites afford unique 
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opportunities to perpetrators to humiliate, manipulate or harass their victim, within an online 
community that is typically occupied by the victim’s friends and family (Brown et al., 2018; 
Moncur & Herron, 2018).  
‘Surveillance’ and ‘monitoring’ are terms that are used interchangeably by researchers. 
Monitoring is often reported as the most common form of technology-based IPV used by 
perpetrators, and has been defined as “the use of ICTs to gather information about a romantic 
partner that creates or enhances a dynamic of control within the relationship” (Brown et al., 
2018). Interpersonal electronic surveillance is characterized as “surreptitious strategies 
individuals use over communication technologies to gain awareness of another user’s offline 
and/or online behaviours” (Tokunaga, 2011, p. 706). Surveillance and monitoring may be 
carried out by partners involved in intimate relationships (even those not involving IPV) as a 
strategy in response to threats of extra-dyadic rivals,  or in the early or intermediate stages of a 
new relationship, to obtain more information about the other (Tokunaga, 2011). 
Technology-enabled abusive behaviours enacted by perpetrators may include 
cyberstalking - unwelcome and intrusive behaviours that involve repeated threats and/or 
harassment via e-mail or other computer-mediated communication (Henry & Powell, 2018; 
Powell & Henry, 2016; Smoker & March, 2017; Southworth et al., 2007); fraping - “an activity 
that involves the unauthorised alteration of information on an individual’s online social network 
site profile by a third party” (Moncur, Orzech, & Neville, 2016, p. 125); monitoring e-mail 
communication either directly on the victim’s computer or through ‘sniffer’ programs (pieces 
of software that collect access codes that allow entry into a targeted system); sending insulting 
e-mails; disrupting e-mail communications by flooding a victim’s e-mail inbox with unwanted 
mail, or by sending a virus program (Marganski & Melander, 2018; Melander, 2010; Moncur 
et al., 2016; Southworth et al., 2007). 
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These abusive behaviours are an extension of common – albeit undesirable - online 
behaviours enacted in romantic relationships. In one survey, over 65% of adults used 
technology to monitor a partner (e.g., hacking into a partner’s email) (Burke, Wallen, Vail-
Smith, & Knox, 2011). In a later survey, 43% of men monitored their partner’s social 
interactions through common technological sources (e.g., mobile phone, e-mail, and social 
networks) by gaining access to their password-protected information, whilst over 15% of men 
used GPS technology to monitor a partner’s activities (Brem et al., 2017). Moreover, Leisring 
and Giumetti (2014) found that 93% of college students both perpetrated and experienced minor 
cyber abuse (e.g., swearing at or insulting partner) involving their partner, whilst 13% 
perpetrated and experienced severe cyber abuse (e.g., threats, public humiliation). 
Objectives 
The purpose of this systematic review was to identify how individuals either experiencing or 
perpetrating IPV engage in covert online behaviours. Specifically, the following research 
questions were addressed. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What covert online strategies do survivors use in relation to 
intimate partner violence? 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): What strategies do perpetrators use online to covertly extend their 
abusive behaviours?  
Research Question 3 (RQ3): How are the strategies identified in RQ1 and RQ2: 
a)   affected by age? 
b)   affected by gender?  
c)   varied across non-Western and diaspora populations? 
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Methods 
A systematic review was conducted, as this affords a more robust approach to searching, 
appraisal and synthesis of the literature than traditional reviews. Systematic reviews were 
originally developed for use in Medical research, however, they are now used in a range of 
different disciplines (Haddaway & Bilotta, 2016). The protocol for this systematic review was 
registered in the International Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews (with Registration 
number CRD42018091691). 
Inclusion/ Exclusion Criteria  
Studies were included in the review if they met the following criteria:  
•   Quantitative or qualitative research studies, which present empirical methods and results;  
•   Explored Internet use, either by individuals who have experienced IPV, in order to facilitate 
protection from perpetrators and support from friends, family and professionals or by 
perpetrators as a means of control, surveillance and harassment;  
•   Included adults aged over 16 who have experienced violence (physical, sexual, emotional) 
from their intimate partner, or perpetrated IPV (no restrictions were placed on gender, 
geographical region, or sexuality);  
•   Written in English language;  
•   Published from 2004 – to current (searches conducted February 2018). We considered 
literature linked to early, as well as current, use of social networking sites. Whilst Facebook 
was released in 2004, MySpace was the largest social networking site in the world from 
2005 to 2008, whilst others were also popular – e.g., Friendster, Bebo, Cyworld. Facebook 
became the most popular social networking site globally in 2009. 
Studies were excluded in the review if they:  
•   Did not report empirical methods and results (e.g., commentaries, editorials);  
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•   Included children and young people under 16 years2; 
•   Included adults who experienced sexual violence or harassment from somebody that was 
not an intimate partner;  
•   Did not explore the use of the Internet in the context of IPV;  
•   Were not published in English;  
•   Were published before 2004: Social media, and in particular social networking sites (SNS) 
such as Facebook, became ubiquitous and started radically altering the nature and scope of 
social interaction for their users (e.g., self-presentation, publicly disclosed information, 
surveillance by audiences) after 2004.  
Search Strategy and Selection Process 
A series of steps were undertaken in identifying relevant papers. These comprised of creating 
and running a search strategy, screening abstracts and titles, evaluating methodological quality 
of each study, extracting relevant data from each study screened successfully, and developing 
a narrative synthesis of the findings from the included studies. Each step is described in turn 
below. 
A search strategy, using Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) terms and relevant key 
words was developed (Appendix Table B). The search strategies included combining terms 
related to IPV with terms related to Internet use with Boolean operators. No restrictions were 
placed on the search in terms of place of publication.  
The following databases were searched: Medline (via Ovid), Social Science Citation 
Index (via Web of Science), ASSIA (via ProQuest), PsycInfo (Ebsco) and ACM Digital 
Library. In addition, Google Scholar was searched, with results capped at the first 100 records, 
                                               
2 We excluded studies which exclusively centred on young populations (children and adolescents under 16). 
However, studies with children and adolescents under 16 that happened to also include adults have been 
included.  
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sorted by relevance. Grey literature was sought by manually searching the following websites 
relevant to the topic area: World Health Organization, United Nations Women, End Violence 
Against Women, Department for International Development, PEW Research Centre. Editorials, 
letters, working papers, reports and reviews were excluded. Finally, in order to ensure no 
relevant studies were omitted, additional studies were identified from the reference lists of 
studies which met the inclusion criteria, and were included in the review.  
All studies identified by the search were imported into Endnote 7 and duplicates were 
removed. Two reviewers (AGr, AGa) independently screened all titles and abstracts against the 
eligibility criteria. At this stage we were purposefully over inclusive and only excluded any 
obviously irrelevant studies. The full-texts of studies potentially meeting the eligibility criteria 
were then retrieved and screened independently by AGr and AGa against the eligibility criteria. 
Differences in judgment at both stages were resolved through a consensus procedure. A record 
was kept of all discarded full-text articles, including the reason for discard. 
The two reviewers independently evaluated the methodological quality of each study, 
using an assessment tool appropriate to the study design. Discrepancies were resolved through 
a consensus procedure. Due to the methodological diversity of the included research studies, a 
range of appraisal tools were necessary to assess different study designs and included:  
•   Critical Appraisal Skills Program (CASP) Checklist for qualitative studies (Dixon-Woods 
et al., 2007; Walsh & Downe, 2006);  
•   Appraisal tool for Cross-Sectional Studies (AXIS tool) (Downes, Brennan, Williams, & 
Dean, 2016);  
•   Cochrane Collaboration Risk of Bias Tool for Randomized controlled trials (CCRBT) 
(Armijo-Olivo, Stiles, Hagen, Biondo, & Cummings, 2012; Higgins et al., 2011);  
•   Quality Assessment Tool for Quantitative Studies (Armijo-Olivo et al., 2012; National and 
Collaborating Centre for Methods, 2008). 
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A data extraction form was developed, reviewed and refined by the researchers and 
includes the following: information on publication (title, authors, year); study aims; 
geographical location; context & setting; sampling approach; ethical issues; participant 
characteristics; data collection methods); data analysis approach; data collected; and results. 
One reviewer extracted the data (AGr), while a second reviewer (AGa) checked all the extracted 
data. 
A narrative synthesis of the findings from the included studies, and the structures 
around the type of studies (experimental, survey, ethnography etc.), was conducted. This 
approach is flexible, allowing for different types of evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, 
to be synthesised (Mays, Pope, & Popay, 2005; Popay et al., 2006). The following stages of 
analysis were used to develop the synthesis. First, Content analysis was used to identify 
different clusters/groupings of covert strategies, the frequency with which these strategies are 
employed and the extent to which they are effective in maintaining privacy. Content analysis is 
a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content 
categories based on explicit rules of coding (Stemler, 2001). It is also useful for examining 
trends and patterns in documents (Mays et al., 2005; Popay et al., 2006). The process of creating 
codes was a combination of both predetermined (a priori) and emergent coding. Predetermined 
coding was based on a previous coding dictionary from other relevant research studies and key 
concepts, whilst emergent coding was based on concepts, actions or meanings that evolved 
from the data and were different from the predetermined codes (Stemler, 2001).  
Secondly, Thematic analysis of the data, the most common method adopted within 
narrative reviews, was used to systematically identify the main, recurrent or most important 
themes or concepts across the included studies. The following three stages were conducted: 
coding text, developing descriptive themes, generating analytical themes (Thomas & Harden, 
2008). As a method, it provides a means of organising and summarising the findings from large, 
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diverse bodies of research (Mays et al., 2005; Popay et al., 2006). NVivo (12.0) qualitative 
software was used to facilitate analysis. It provides a robust and pragmatic way to manage the 
complexities of conducting qualitative evidence synthesis, facilitates framework synthesis and 
provides clear an audit trail, enhancing confidence in synthesis findings (Houghton et al., 2017).  
Thirdly, the findings of these analyses for each study were then compared using a 
process known as translation (France et al., 2019). Translation enables common themes from 
across the studies to be identified and then synthesised narratively. The synthesis goes beyond 
simple reporting of individual study findings, and aims to bring together the combined findings 
of all the studies using a textual approach. Finally, the robustness of the narrative synthesis was 
assessed by considering the quality of the evidence related to the research findings, and for 
drawing conclusions about the strategies (Popay et al., 2006). 
Results 
Using the search strategy and selection process described above resulted in only 22 articles 
being retained from an initial set of 3158 citations (see Figure 1), with the result set 
incrementally reduced as follows: (i) The search of the predefined databases resulted in 3056 
records. (ii) A further 102 records were found in other sources, giving a total of 3158 citations. 
The latter included references from relevant studies, reviews and publications from Google 
scholar. (iii) After duplicates were removed (n=370), a total of 2788 citations were screened 
against the inclusion criteria. (iv) Of these, 2705 citations were excluded on the basis of title, 
keywords, and abstract. (v) The full texts of the remaining articles (n=83) were then assessed 
against the inclusion criteria, resulting in 22 articles being retained. The reasons for exclusion 
are presented in Figure 1. Of the twenty-two studies retained (Appendix Table A1), nine were 
qualitative, eleven were cross-sectional studies, one study was a Randomized Control Trial 
(RCT) and one study was a non-randomized study (NRS). The majority of studies were 
conducted in the USA (n=19), whilst one was conducted in Canada and two in Australia. 
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Sample size ranged from 6 to 1683 participants (6,932 in total; mean sample size: 315.1; median 
sample size: 112).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Strategies used 
The narrative synthesis described above served to identify three strategies which satisfied RQ1 
– i.e., they were used as covert strategies used by survivors in relation to intimate partner 
violence: presence online, granular control and use of digital support tools and services. One 
strategy was identified that satisfied RQ2: stalking and surveillance, which was used by 
perpetrators. All strategies are detailed in Table 1 (see also Appendix Table A2), and expanded 
upon below. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Digital devices (such as smartphones, computers, tablets, GPS devices, digital cameras), tools 
and services (such as web/ mobile applications, software, blocking/ monitoring tools, spyware) 
enabled these strategies, by providing those experiencing IPV with easy access to information, 
and opportunities for professional, peer support and concealment from perpetrators. However, 
these same devices, tools and services were also used by perpetrators in monitoring or harassing 
their partners, and in deterring supportive behaviours (see Tables 2 and 3; Appendix Tables A3 
and A4). Thus, digital technologies can be helpful, but social networking sites such as Facebook 
do not easily provide the kind of privacy that victims of IPV require. A summary table of critical 
findings is also provided below (see Table 4). 
[Insert Table 2] 
[Insert Table 3] 
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 Presence online. 
Access to a computer appears to have a protective effect, reducing abuse by giving the person 
experiencing IPV the opportunity to seek out supportive people who also offer information and 
advice (Bosch & Schumm, 2004). For some, a mobile device was their only connection to the 
outside world (Choo et al., 2015; Lindsay et al., 2013; Tarzia, Iyer, Thrower, & Hegarty, 2017). 
Online social networking sites, such as Facebook, facilitate communication between 
friends and acquaintances, and mediate the provision of information about activities, interests 
and opinions amongst friends and acquaintances (Chaulk & Jones, 2011; Halligan, Knox, & 
Brinkley, 2013). In times of isolation and separation from their social network, social media 
sites such as Facebook provide survivors with much needed connection to family and friends, 
and associated social support, even though survivors may have concerns about privacy  
(Dimond, Fiesler, & Bruckman, 2011). 
Conversely, three studies reported that survivors restricted their presence online, and 
access/ use of technology (Dimond et al., 2011; Freed et al., 2017; Matthews et al., 2017). Some 
survivors avoided going online, e.g., using a paper calendar, fearing that their abuser had greater 
technical prowess and could uncover their activities (Freed et al., 2017).  Constraints were also 
placed on survivors’ online activities through perpetrators’ physical control of devices and 
monitoring behaviours (Dimond et al., 2011; Matthews et al., 2017). 
Granular Control. 
Survivors adopted more fine-grained strategies of control over their online presence, by 
concealing their identities and location, blocking contact from their perpetrators, strengthening 
privacy settings, restricting the content that they posted, and changing their digital devices in 
various ways.  
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Creation of anonymous email accounts protected survivors’ identities (Finn & 
Atkinson, 2009). Dimond et al. (2011) identified that survivors would register a new prepaid 
mobile phone under an alias to conceal their identity, and could feel unable to use their real 
names again, as they feared that their information could show up on other phones or on the 
Internet.   
Survivors could also be proactive in using blocking mechanisms: for example, 
installing caller ID or call blocking to prevent the perpetrator contacting them, changing or 
installing new locks or security systems (Truman, 2011), or installing software that warns when 
someone is trying to hack into their accounts (Dimond et al., 2011; Freed et al., 2017; Matthews 
et al., 2017; Truman, 2011). However, attempts to evade contact with their perpetrator were 
made more challenging by difficulties in blocking unwanted calls and text messages, including 
financial costs and service provision by network carrier (Dimond et al., 2011). 
Five studies reported use of strengthened privacy settings as a way of achieving 
granular control over survivors’ online presence: for example, using Facebook privacy settings 
to restrict the majority of their profile to friends only, as well as to block some individuals and 
to limit profile viewing to others (Chaulk & Jones, 2011). Some types of privacy and security 
options that were particularly useful to survivors were those that enabled them to safely and 
privately use alternate devices (e.g., using private browsing on someone else’s device), 
effectively control their digital traces (e.g., delete content), and maintain ambiguity and/or 
plausible deniability in their use of technology (Finn & Atkinson, 2009; Freed et al., 2017; 
Matthews et al., 2017; Tarzia et al., 2017).  
Other common practices that survivors used included limiting or avoiding sharing 
personal information online (e.g., social number security, personal and family pictures, 
Google account information, credit cards) (Dimond et al., 2011; Freed et al., 2017; Matthews 
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et al., 2017). Some opted to shut down some of their online accounts, or to delete content and 
activity histories. Strategies used to achieve control over online presence extended to physical 
devices as well. Survivors threw away their devices (e.g., mobile phones), used alternative 
devices, changed their SIM card or Internet service provider, performed a factory reset on their 
device, and turned off services like location tracking and Wi-Fi (Freed et al., 2017; Matthews 
et al., 2017).  
Use of digital support tools and services 
A range of digital support tools and services were made use of by those experiencing IPV, to 
empower them and increase their safety, engage in screening for IPV with professional 
agencies, and access online support from those with similar experiences.  
Five studies reported on digital interventions which helped to empower individuals 
experiencing IPV and keep them safe (Bacchus et al., 2016; Bloom et al., 2014; Choo et al., 
2015; Constantino, Crane, Noll, Doswell, & Braxter, 2007; Finn & Atkinson, 2009). For 
example, the Online Safety Planning Intervention by Bloom et al. (2014) is a tool designed to 
provide pregnant abused women with additional strategies on their individualized safety plans 
(e.g., considerations for escape planning in isolated areas) based upon their self-reported 
residency. A further example of digital safety planning is offered by Lindsay et al. (2013): the 
Safety Decision Aid Smartphone Application provides personalized safety plan suggestions 
based on the user’s responses to questions in the interactive app. For example, if a user indicates 
in the “My Relationship” section that their partner uses social media to harass them, the 
personalized safety plan may include detailed information about protecting Internet accounts 
and limiting access to, or closing, these accounts until they feel safe. Additionally, if a user’s 
“Danger Assessment” score indicates an extreme level of danger, the suggested safety strategies 
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that are offered are worded more urgently to indicate the importance of taking action (Lindsay 
et al., 2013).  
Other approaches involve training individuals on computer safety and other specific 
technologies, in order to ensure privacy: for example, how to secure a computer against spyware 
which can monitor computer usage, how to turn off GPS which can be used to track a person’s 
movements and real-time location, and how to protect baby monitors from being hacked into 
and thus avoid one’s home being surveilled remotely. This training has been shown to be 
effective in helping participants to feel safer (Finn & Atkinson, 2009). Another digital tool, 
MIVO, was found to be useful as “an email interaction device among women, their child and a 
nurse to reduce their risk for further interpersonal violence/abuse and to increase disclosure of 
abuse”, and to provide support and information (Constantino et al., 2007).  
Digital tools were also used to screen for IPV. For instance, women presenting at 
hospital emergency departments found that divulging partner abuse via a computer-based 
screening tool was therapeutic and empowering, and many felt that the computer made it easier 
to report their experiences compared to face to face interaction (Choo et al., 2015). Similar 
results were reported by Bacchus et al. (2016) who evaluated the use of the DOVE (Domestic 
Violence Enhanced Home Visitation Program) programme to screen for IPV in pregnant 
women using computer tablets. DOVE eliminated the complex process for those experiencing 
IPV of waiting for the right moment in the relationship to ask about or disclose abuse. This was 
advantageous to women in terms of being able to access help quickly. A further advantage of 
the computer tablet was its built-in safety mechanism: an icon switched from the DOVE 
program to a baby video in the case of an unexpected interruption, such as the perpetrator 
coming home. Only the home visitor could reactivate DOVE with their unique identification 
number. The greater sense of anonymity and privacy afforded by DOVE in using a computer 
tablet (compared to face-to-face interview) meant that women were more likely to answer 
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questions openly around the nature of the abuse that they were experiencing (Bacchus et al., 
2016). 
Tarzia et al. (2017) report that younger women who experience IPV prefer online 
support services  delivered via websites and apps to face-to-face communication for provision 
of embarrassing or sensitive information. The anonymity of these online services afforded a 
more objective and unbiased perspective than they might receive from known friends and 
family. They also identify important benefits associated with online support services, of 
convenience, flexibility, low cost, and ability to fill service gaps. However, they also note the 
need to design such services with the involvement of service users, and to attend carefully to 
factors such as language, tone, anonymity and links to sources of face-to-face support in service 
design, in order to encourage uptake (Tarzia et al., 2017).  
More broadly, web search tools such as Google were used by survivors to search for 
information, including general technology information such as learning about new apps, and 
more specific information – for example, online privacy and safety specific searches (Bloom et 
al., 2014; Finn & Atkinson, 2009). Survivors also sought out information provided by IPV 
support organizations, including high-level summaries of how to think about digital privacy 
and safety, guides about privacy settings for Facebook, and discussion of security practices such 
as picking strong passwords (Freed et al., 2017; Lindsay et al., 2013; Tarzia et al., 2017). They 
found it acceptable to seek advice on IPV via computers/mobile devices, particularly when 
social supports were unavailable, or when information needed to be accessed privately and 
safely.  
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Stalking and Surveillance.  
Perpetrators secretly extended their abusive behaviours via the Internet, through electronic 
surveillance and stalking/ harassment. They also extended pre-existing coercive behaviour 
online via sexting coercion (Ross, Drouin, & Coupe, 2016).   
Stalking was undertaken in a number of ways. Perpetrators monitored their partner’s3 
social media activity, by constantly checking their profile for updates, waiting for them to come 
online, looking at the photos their partner had posted and reading their News feed (Brem, 
Spiller, & Vandehey, 2015; Chaulk & Jones, 2011; Fox & Tokunaga, 2015). They monitored 
their partner’s connections with others, by visiting the groups that their partner had joined, 
checking out the events their partner planned to attend and the friends he/ she had recently 
added, and using Facebook to "keep tabs" on their partner and/or his/ her family. Perpetrators 
also monitored their partner’s location, checking their status on social media to see where they 
would be (Burke et al., 2011; Finn & Atkinson, 2009; Freed et al., 2017; Matthews et al., 2017; 
Reed, Tolman, & Ward, 2016; Truman, 2011; Woodlock, 2017), and by using GPS devices to 
monitor their real-time location (Freed et al., 2017; Truman, 2011). Chaulk and Jones (2011) 
found that perpetrators’ online stalking and relational intrusion was frequently facilitated by 
Facebook. Even when a partner blocked the perpetrator from their Facebook account the 
perpetrator may continue their monitoring via the Facebook pages of shared friends, family, or 
even their children (Brem et al., 2015; Burke et al., 2011; Dimond et al., 2011; Fox & Tokunaga, 
2015; Woodlock, 2017).  
‘Surveillance’ and ‘monitoring’ are terms that are used interchangeably by researchers 
in the included studies. In the context of IPV, perpetrators’ surveillance of past activities and 
                                               
3 In using the term ‘partner’ here, we refer to either a current partner who remains in the abusive relationship, or 
an ex-partner who is no longer in the relationship yet the perpetrator seeks to continue their abusive behaviour 
towards them. 
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communications involved checking call histories, email histories and mobile phone bills (Finn 
& Atkinson, 2009; Woodlock, 2017). Snooping through a partner’s private communications 
and messages was achieved by using their passwords to log into their online accounts without 
their knowledge (Marcum, Higgins, & Nicholson, 2017), or by hacking into their computers 
and mobile phones (Freed et al., 2017; Reed et al., 2016), and e-mail accounts (Rothman, 
Meade, & Decker, 2009). Using spyware was the most common tactic used by perpetrators in 
order to monitor their partners. This did not always go undiscovered: several survivors reported 
finding spyware on their computer or phone (Burke et al., 2011; Freed et al., 2017; Matthews 
et al., 2017; Truman, 2011; Woodlock, 2017). Surveillance of physical activity and interactions 
was undertaken using web cameras, cameras hidden in the home, spyware installed on the 
partner’s computer, and listening devices/ bugs (Burke et al., 2011; Dimond et al., 2011; 
Truman, 2011; Woodlock, 2017). Monitoring activities could also be less direct: for example, 
perpetrators could spy by pretending to be the victim/ survivor in a chat room or email 
conversation (Finn & Atkinson, 2009; Woodlock, 2017).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Effect of demographic variables on identified strategies 
RQ3 asked how the strategies identified in RQ1 and RQ2 are affected by age and gender, and 
how they varied across non-Western and diaspora populations. Due to the sensitive topic of the 
review, the majority of the included studies lacked adequate information about demographic 
characteristics, such as gender, age and geographical region. It was therefore difficult to explore 
the relationship between strategies used and the demographics and draw general conclusions. 
Although some of the studies included sufficient demographic characteristics, only half of them 
included both genders, with women outnumbering men. Only one study included information 
about the effect of age and geographical region on identified strategies.  
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Truman (2011) reported that those stalked by intimate partners are significantly younger 
than those stalked by known others and unknown offenders. Age was significantly and 
positively associated with higher scores on the seriousness of stalking scale. The same study 
reported that race/ethnicity (black and other, non-Hispanic) and stalking type (cyberstalking 
and stalking with technology) were significant. Both black and other, non-Hispanic stalking 
victims had significantly higher odds than white, non-Hispanics of defining the behaviours they 
experienced as stalking (Truman, 2011). However, given these findings are only from one study 
they must be interpreted with caution. 
Women were significantly more likely to monitor partners’ behaviours by checking call 
histories, checking email histories, checking social networking sites, using partner’s password 
to monitor electronic communication, sending excessive emails and making excessive calls. 
Conversely, women were significantly more likely to report a partner’s use of technology, such 
as hidden cameras or GPS, to monitor their behaviour (Burke et al., 2011; Truman, 2011). 
Marcum et al. (2017) indicated that university students who reported participating in 
cyberstalking via attempted log-ins to their partner’s social media were more likely to be male. 
According to Reed et al. (2016), there were no gender differences in number of digital dating 
abuse behaviours experienced, however women reported more digital media use overall. 
Moreover, women were more likely than men to be coerced into sexting. Women reported 
higher rates and more frequent sexting coercion compared with men, and engaged in more 
sexting unwillingly. These data suggest that women may be even more likely to “give in” to 
pressures to sext than to have unwanted but consensual intercourse (Ross et al., 2016). There 
was a lack of information on other important demographics of interest such as marital status, 
sexual orientation of the couple and citizenship status and this warrants future enquiry. 
Similarly, further research on the influence of age and ethnicity is also warranted. 
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Quality Assessment 
The majority of the qualitative studies stated the aims of the research clearly (n=8), used 
appropriate recruitment strategy (n=8) and considered relevant ethical issues (n=7). In addition, 
they included sufficiently rigorous data analysis (n=8), stated the findings clearly (n=7), as well 
as, discussed the contribution of the study and the generalizability of research findings (n=8). 
The majority of the studies (n=7) did not consider the relationship between researcher and 
participants adequately. Only 5 studies collected the data in a way that addressed the research 
issues. All included studies used appropriate qualitative methodology (Appendix Table C1). 
The majority of the cross-sectional studies presented their aims clearly (n=8), included 
appropriate study design (n=10), defined the target population clearly (n=7), measured 
appropriately the risk factor and outcome variables (n=10), described the basic data adequately 
(n=7), presented the results for all the analyses described in the methods (n=9). In addition, they 
included well justified discussions and conclusions (n=9) and discussed the limitations of the 
studies (n=10). Only half of the studies included a sample frame taken from an appropriate 
population base so that it closely represented the target/reference population under 
investigation; measured the risk factor and outcome variables correctly using instruments/ 
measurements that had been trialled, piloted or published previously; included information 
about ethical approval. None of the studies included sample size justification section nor 
measurements to address and categorise non-responders nor described information about non-
responders. Sample size justification is crucial as sample size profoundly affects the 
significance of the outcomes of the study. Moreover, nonresponse bias occurs if the non-
responders are substantially different to the rest of the population in the sample. Thus, any 
information on non-responders is crucial. Furthermore, only Truman (2011) used appropriate 
sampling frame. It is very important that the sampling frame is representative of the target 
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population as results from the study are going to be used to make assumptions about the target 
population (Appendix Table C2). 
The RCT study (Bloom et al., 2014) was judged as having high risk of bias, while the 
NRS (Finn & Atkinson, 2009) was judged as weak. The last two sections of the Quality 
Assessment Tool for Quantitative Studies - the interview integrity and the analysis - were also 
assigned a quality rating of weak. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Strategies 
This review sought to understand what covert online strategies survivors and 
perpetrators deploy with respect to intimate partner violence. A total of 22 studies (9 qualitative 
studies, 11 cross-sectional studies, 1 RCT and 1 NRS) were included in the evidence synthesis. 
The majority of studies were conducted in the USA. Notably, there was a substantial increase 
in relevant published studies from 2010 onwards. Four covert strategies were identified: 
presence online, granular control and use of digital support tools and services were used by 
survivors, whilst stalking and surveillance was used by perpetrators of IPV. The strategy of 
presence online encompassed access to a computer, social connection and support, and 
restricted presence. It is important to note that whilst survivors can access support and advice 
online, they may avoid going online for fear of their perpetrator pursuing them into this space. 
At a time when interpersonal communications, economic activity and public services are all 
increasingly conducted online, survivors’ fear of being online disadvantages them and may 
remove access to social, informational and practical support. If they did go online, survivors 
could adopt fine-grained strategies of control over their online presence, by concealing their 
identities and location, blocking contact from their perpetrators, strengthening privacy settings, 
restricting the content that they posted, and changing their digital devices in various ways. 
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Survivors use of digital support tools and services could help to empower them and increase 
their safety, engage them in screening for IPV with professional agencies, and provide access 
to online information and support from professionals and from those with similar experiences. 
Whilst the Internet can thus be seen as a potential ‘force for good’, it can also be used by 
perpetrators to secretly extend their abusive behaviours, through digital surveillance, stalking/ 
harassment, and sexting coercion.  
Strengths and Limitations 
A strength of this systematic review is the comprehensive search strategy used, which facilitated 
a more evidence-based approach to literature searching in a field where this is not standard 
practice. Moreover, inclusion of study designs other than quantitative studies gave a wide and 
diverse range of evidence. In the present systematic review, we also included ‘‘grey’’ literature. 
Another important strength is the use of diverse methodological quality assessment tools, to 
assess the risk of bias of the included qualitative, quantitative and mixed-methods studies. 
We acknowledge the limitations regarding the number of studies and the 
methodological quality of studies included. An important limitation of this work, is the lack of 
research on the most current technologies. Most of the studies which passed our screening 
criteria involved the use of Facebook. However, other social media platforms are increasingly 
being used (e.g., Instagram, Twitter, WhatsApp, Snap Chat), and we do not yet know how they 
are used either by perpetrators or those experiencing IPV. In addition, studies not in English 
were excluded from the study which may bias the findings. As such, the results should be 
interpreted with some caution.  
Future work 
The review highlighted the need for more well-designed studies that address covert 
strategies. We need robust research which delivers insights into IPV survivors’ and 
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perpetrators’ online covert behaviours and activities with regard to demographic characteristics, 
effects on physical and mental health outcomes, and use of a wider range of social media 
services (e.g., Instagram, WhatsApp, etc.). These understandings can help practitioners to 
gather a more nuanced contemporary picture of survivors’ experiences of IPV, and to develop 
advice for survivors that reflects current digital behaviours. They can also assist law-
enforcement agencies to be aware of new routes for gathering forensic evidence on abusive 
behaviours (Nelson, 2019), and inform new legislation on IPV so that it factors in online 
behaviours.  
Finally, we highlight the need for engagement between those who design digital 
technologies and those with expertise around IPV, to ensure that the design of digital 
technologies takes account of the risks that can surface for those experiencing IPV. Whilst there 
is growing interest within the Human-Computer Interaction community in designing 
technologies to respond to sensitive contexts and events (Chancellor, Andalibi, Blackwell, 
Nemer, & Moncur, 2019; Herron, Andalibi, Haimson, Moncur, & van den Hoven, 2016; 
Moncur, 2013),  partnership with knowledgeable practitioners and those with lived experience 
is vital in shaping the appropriate design of digital technologies (Table 5). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Supplemental material 
Tables A1-A4. Experiencing or perpetrating Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) 
Table A1. Characteristics of the included studies 
Study; 
Country; Type 
of 
Methodology 
Key themes; Aim Context and 
setting 
Sampling 
approach 
Participant 
characteristics 
Data collection 
methods 
Data analysis 
approach 
Data collected Ethical issues 
Bacchus et al., 
2016; USA; 
Qualitative 
study 
Strategies, 
Facilitators;  
• To explore 
perinatal home 
visitors’ and 
women’s 
experiences of 
screening for IPV 
and receiving 
DOVE in the 
form of either 
mHealth 
technology (i.e., a 
computer tablet) 
or a home visitor-
led method.  
47 women 
enrolled to the 
DOVE trial who 
had consented to 
participating in a 
qualitative 
interview. 
Interviews with 
women took place 
in their homes if it 
was safe to do so, 
or away from the 
home in the 
researcher’s car. 
We invited 45 
home visitors at 
the 8 study sites to 
participate in an 
interview, which 
was conducted at 
their office. The 2 
designers of the 
DOVE computer 
tablet were 
interviewed 
together via 
Skype. 
Purposeful 
sampling using 
maximum 
variation to select 
women 
26 women between 16 
and 35 years old; 
White, African/ 
African American/ 
black, Mixed ethnic 
origin, speaking 
English or Spanish; 
27% Urban, 73% 
Rural; 4% 7th to 9th 
grade, 27% 10th to 
12th grade, 27% High 
school graduate/GED, 
38% Some college or 
trade school, 4% 
College graduate; 
69% had experienced 
IPV in year before 
current pregnancy 
while 31% hadn't 
experienced IPV in 
year before current 
pregnancy. Of the 23 
home visitors, 9 were 
from urban sites and 
14 were from rural 
sites. The age range 
was between 25 and 
66 years. 
Between November 
2013 and August 
2014, the first 
author (LJB) 
conducted semi-
structured 
interviews with 
perinatal home 
visitors and women 
enrolled in DOVE. 
Interviews lasted 
between 1 and 2 
hours and used a 
topic guide that 
explored a wide 
range of areas. 
Interviews were 
digitally recorded 
and transcribed 
verbatim. NVivo 10 
software was used. 
Thematic analysis 
was used to 
identify, analyse, 
and report on 
patterns within the 
data. The initial 
coding framework 
in NVivo was 
guided by the 
interview schedule 
themes and was 
deductive. Deeper 
exploration and 
interrogation of the 
data was inductive, 
allowing additional 
themes and their 
subcategories to 
emerge. 
51 participants 
(23 home visiting 
staff, 26 women, 
and 2 DOVE 
computer program 
designers) and 4 
nonparticipant 
observations were 
conducted 
The study was 
approved by the 
University of 
Virginia 
Institutional 
Review 
Board for Social 
and Behavioural 
Sciences and the 
European Union 
ethics review 
panel. 
Bloom et al., 
2014; USA; 
RCT 
Strategies, 
Facilitators;  
Recruitment was 
from community 
settings (not IPV 
Convenience 
sampling of 
46 women: mean age 
25.4 years (range = 
18–35 years). Family 
Women accessed 
the tool from their 
own safe computer; 
Descriptive 
statistics  
46 women 
ultimately 
completing 
The University 
of Missouri 
Institutional 
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• To establish 
feasibility 
(usability, safety, 
and acceptability) 
of the adapted 
tool for both rural 
and urban 
pregnant abused 
women and 
practicality of 
recruitment 
procedures for 
future trials. 
shelters), targeting 
women not 
already accessing 
formal IPV 
resources, 
distributing about 
500 recruitment 
flyers in settings 
where pregnant 
women seek 
services. Ads 
were posted 
online, and 
classified print 
ads were placed in 
rural papers. 
women (randomly 
selected) 
income for 91.3% was 
<$2,000 a month from 
all sources (e.g., 
employment, gifts, 
social services), and 
47.8% had children 
under the age of 18 
years residing with 
them. Approximately 
three of four were 
White, and over half 
(56.6%) had at least 
some college 
education. 41% of the 
participants (n = 19) 
resided in a county 
designated 
as nonmetropolitan by 
the USDA 2003 
Rural–Urban 
Continuum 
codes 
two rural Missouri 
health departments 
were partnered with 
to install computers 
in private areas that 
women could use if 
needed. Potential 
participants made 
contact by a toll-
free number or e-
mail. 
Women were 
randomized to 
intervention or 
control conditions 
and provided 
password-protected 
access to the tool. 
All completed self-
report measures of 
IPV exposure, 
safety behaviours, 
decisional conflict, 
and IPV-related 
health outcomes and 
received emergency 
safety plans. 
Intervention women 
completed the DA 
and the priority 
setting activity and 
received tailored 
safety plans. 
Women were asked 
to complete 4 online 
sessions (early 
pregnancy, late 
pregnancy, 3 and 6 
months postpartum 
calculated within 
the tool based upon 
her due date), with 
gift cards sent after 
baseline sessions 
online 
Review Board 
reviewed and 
approved 
study 
procedures 
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each session via e-
mail or letter to the 
safe address of their 
choice. 
Bosch and 
Schumm, 2004; 
USA;  
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, 
Facilitators;  
• How supportive 
and non-
supportive 
persons helped or 
hindered their 
access to 
resources, and 
whether access to 
resources 
influenced the 
women’s ability 
to become free 
from abuse. 
42 of the 105 
counties in 
Kansas met initial 
study criteria. 
Randomly 
selected 10 of the 
42 Kansas 
counties; 
community 
agencies; local 
restaurants, 
laundromats, 
ice cream shops, 
convenience 
stores, grocery 
stores, donut 
shops, motels, and 
beauty shops; ads 
in local county 
newspapers 
Randomly 
selected. 1/3 of 
the participants 
were recruited 
with the 
assistance of the 
staff of various 
community 
agencies who had 
contact with rural 
women in abusive 
partner 
relationships. 
Other contacts 
were made by the 
interviewer, who 
used a variety of 
sources (local 
restaurants, 
laundromats, ice 
cream shops etc.). 
3 participants 
were interviewed 
as a result of ads 
placed in local 
county 
newspapers 
The average age of 
subjects was 40.5 
years (SD = 8.6), with 
a range of 22 to 63 
years. The majority of 
the subjects were 
Caucasian (84%), and 
some were Native 
Americans (14%) or 
African-Americans 
(2%). Most of their 
former partners were 
Caucasian (82%), 
Hispanic (11%), or 
Native American 
(7%). 
Additional demographics: 
education, marital status, 
minor children, 
Household income, 
occupation, residency in 
rural areas, religious 
affiliation, geographical 
location and isolation, 
experience of abuse 
(p.359-361) 
face-to-face 
interviews with 
women  
Data was analysed 
SPSS. Means, 
standard deviations, 
and frequencies 
were computed for 
items describing 
geographic or social 
isolation. A paired 
samples t-test to 
compare former and 
current levels of 
abuse. Pearson 
correlation 
coefficients of the 
independent and 
dependent variables. 
Multiple linear 
regression 
procedures, using 
backwards 
elimination of 
variables, to 
examine the 
relationship of each 
of the independent 
variables to abuse 
during the 
relationship and to 
abuse at the time of 
the interview. 
56 participants 
(women) 
Ethical issues 
haven’t been 
taken into 
consideration 
Brem et al., 
2015; USA;  
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• To examine the 
display of mate-
retention tactics 
in an online, 
social-
networking 
environment and 
how these online 
Introductory 
psychology 
courses at a small, 
public, liberal arts 
university in 
North Texas;  
class and campus 
announcements  
141 participants 
(53 men, 88 
women) were 
recruited from 
introductory 
psychology 
courses at a small, 
public, liberal arts 
university in 
Participants’ ages 
ranged from 18 to 48 
years. The mean age 
of the men was 20.3 
years, the mean age of 
women was 20.5 
years, and 6 
participants (3.4%) 
were above the age of 
Data were collected 
in two waves: 1) a 
packet of pencil-
and-paper 
questionnaires and 
2) online data 
collection via 
Survey Monkey.  
 
Descriptive 
Analyses; 
exploratory factor 
analysis with 
varimax rotation; 
hierarchical 
multiple regression 
analyses 
177 participants 
(112 women; 65 
men) 
The procedures 
used for the 
study were 
approved by the 
university’s 
committee 
for the 
protection of 
human subjects 
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behaviours are 
associated with 
relationship 
aggression. 
North Texas to 
complete a pencil-
and-paper 
questionnaire. 
36 additional 
participants (12 
men, 24 women) 
were recruited 
from class and 
campus 
announcements 
where they were 
given a link to 
complete an 
online version of 
the questionnaire 
29 years. The mean 
relationship length 
was 18.2 months. The 
sample consisted of 
115 European 
American (65%), 22 
African American 
(12.4%), 26 Hispanic 
(14.7%), 7 Asian 
(4%), 6 Caribbean or 
West Indian (3.4%), 
and 1 American 
Indian (.6%). 172 
participants identified 
as heterosexual 
(97.2%), 3 
participants identified 
as bisexual (1.7%), 
and 2 participants 
identified as gay male 
or lesbian (1.1%). The 
mean length of time 
spent on Facebook on 
a typical day was 50.8 
min. 
Burke et al., 
2011; USA;  
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• Do college 
students use 
various 
communication 
technologies to 
monitor or 
control partners 
in intimate 
relationships? 
• Are college 
students the 
victim of such 
monitoring or 
controlling 
behaviours? 
• What are the 
demographics of 
A large 
southeastern 
university 
Convenience 
sampling 
Participants were 
recruited from a 
personal health 
course required 
for graduation. 
Researchers used 
in-class and 
online 
announcements to 
ask these students 
to complete the 
anonymous 
survey. 
 
A sample of 804 
participants. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 23 
(M = 19.12) years. 
Regarding race, 77% 
of the sample self-
identified as white, 
14% as black, and 9% 
as ‘‘other’’ (Latino, 
Asian–American, and 
American Indian). Of 
those indicating 
gender, 500 
participants (67.1%) 
were females and 245 
(32.9%) were males, 
compared to the 
university’s profile of 
Responses were 
collected online 
using Qualtrics 
Survey Software. 
Receipts were 
generated when 
completed surveys 
were submitted. 
Participants 
received extra-credit 
points by presenting 
these printed 
receipts to their 
health instructors. 
Content and face 
validity of the 
instrument were 
established; The 
data were subjected 
to a Principal 
Component 
Analysis (PCA); 
reliability measures;  
Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha 
was used to 
determine internal 
consistency 
reliability. 
804 participants 
(532 women & 
272 men); (a 62% 
response 
rate) 
The survey, 
consent 
form, and 
research 
protocols were 
approved by the 
university’s 
Institutional 
Review Board. 
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students who are 
both the initiators 
and the recipients 
of this type of 
behaviour? 
• What are the 
validity and 
reliability of the 
CPI- Self/ Partner 
scale? 
62% female and 38% 
male. 
Chaulk and 
Jones, 2011; 
Canada; 
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• To determine 
whether or not 
online social 
networks provide 
an environment 
in which 
relational 
intrusive 
behaviour can 
occur and, if so, 
to examine the 
form in which 
this o-ORI 
occurs. 
A large Canadian 
university 
Respondents 
recruited from the 
email lists of an 
undergraduate 
business faculty at 
a large Canadian 
university. 
230 respondents that 
included an even 
distribution of males 
and females, the 
majority of whom 
were between the ages 
of 18 and 25. 
Each respondent 
was randomly 
assigned to one of 6 
groups based on two 
variables (to report 
either their 
behaviours as 
“doers” of the o-
ORI tactics or the 
behaviours of others 
towards them as 
“receivers” of the o-
ORI tactics.  
 
Frequency analysis 230 participants  Ethical issues 
haven’t been 
taken into 
consideration 
Choo et al., 
2015; USA; 
Qualitative 
study 
Strategies, 
Facilitators;  
• To explore 
women’s’ 
attitudes about 
use of computers 
for screening and 
intervening in 
drug use and 
partner abuse. 
Emergency 
department 
Convenience 
sampling (of day 
and evening, 
weekday and 
weekend shifts in 
order to capture 
the full range of 
ED visits) 
Adult female patients 
between the ages of 
18 and 65 years fluent 
in English; mean age 
was 30.6 years 
(median 28.5 years, 
range 18 to 50 years). 
10 women non-white: 
4 black/African 
American, 2 
Hispanic/Latino, one 
Asian, 1 American 
Indian/Alaska Native 
and 2 mixed race. 2 
high school but did 
not graduate; 7 high 
school or a general 
educational 
Semi-structured 
interviews: A 
survey, 
administered on a 
tablet-style 
computer (iPad), 
contained questions 
on a broad range of 
health-related 
topics. Those who 
qualified for the 
study & provided 
written informed 
consent were 
scheduled for an 
interview date 
An integrated set of 
codes, consisting of 
all mutually agreed-
upon codes, was 
entered into the 
NVIVO database 
with the final 
version of each 
transcript 
17 participants 
(women) 
The Institutional 
Review Board 
(IRB) of the 
participating 
hospital 
approved all 
study 
procedures. 
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development (GED) 
certificate; 7 currently 
in college; 1 a college 
degree. 8 single/never 
married, 3 married, 1 
separated, 2 divorced, 
and 3 a member of an 
unmarried couple. 8 
had children. 
Constantino et 
al., 2007; USA; 
Qualitative 
study 
Strategies, 
Facilitators;  
• To test the 
feasibility of an 
email device 
called MIVO for 
use in interacting 
with women and 
children after 
receiving 
Protection from 
Abuse 
The 
Neighbourhood 
Legal Services 
Association 
(NLSA) 
Subjects were 
recruited via 
announcements 
placed at NLSA 
waiting room.  
 
A majority of the six 
mother and child pairs 
was White, 
non-Hispanic (75%, n 
= 9) and the rest were 
African 
Americans. The 
women were between 
30 and 45 years old 
and the children were 
from 11 to 13 years of 
age. Most of the 
women completed 
high school, and three 
women had college 
degrees 
Qualitative 
phenomenological 
Design; 
An interventionist 
trained both mother 
and child how to 
use ‘MIVO’, an 
Internet-connected 
computer (55–70 
min orientation 
included a 5-min 
practice session). 
Thematic Analysis 
The process of 
corroboration, or 
triangulation 
method was 
used to ensure 
consistency and 
guard against bias; 
The analytic steps 
specifically 
included open 
coding, axial coding 
and selective coding 
followed by 
summarization 
Sample included 
six mothers who 
have received a 
PFA within the 
past 6 months. 
(The sample 
included six 
mother and child 
pairs (n=12) but 
only adults’ 
responses were 
taken into 
consideration) 
Consent 
forms were 
obtained; No 
further 
information 
about ethical 
approval 
Dimond et al., 
2011; USA; 
Qualitative 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• To explore how 
domestic violence 
survivors have 
been affected in 
any way with the 
addition of new 
ICTs. 
A domestic 
violence shelter in 
the southern 
United States 
Convenience 
sampling; An 
employee who 
was the first 
author’s mentor 
during 
volunteering 
spread word that 
we were 
conducting 
research 
interviews 
concerning 
domestic violence 
and technology. 
6 women were 
African American, 2 
were white, 1 was 
Caribbean, and 1 was 
from Sub-Saharan 
Africa; Age between 
20s and 50s.  
The interviews 
reflect methods 
used in feminist 
participatory action 
research 
Thematic Analysis 
Authors transcribed 
the interviews from 
audio; identified 
general patterns of 
experience and 
subthemes in the 
patterns 
10 women Consent 
forms were 
obtained; No 
further 
information 
about ethical 
approval 
Finn and 
Atkinson, 2009; 
USA; 
Strategies, 
Facilitators;  
Domestic 
violence agencies 
Participants at 
domestic violence 
agencies were 
Age ranged from 15 
to 74 years, with a 
median age of 35 
Technology 
education and 
training was 
Descriptive 
statistics; T-test 
729 domestic 
violence service 
participants 
Ethical issues 
haven’t been 
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NRS • To discuss the 
development, 
implementation, 
and evaluation of 
a model program 
to provide 
technology 
awareness, 
knowledge, and 
skills to victims 
of domestic 
violence through 
a training 
program at 
domestic violence 
victim service 
offices and 
shelters in 
Washington State 
asked to 
participate in the 
training as well as 
in the evaluation  
(Non-randomized) 
years and a mean of 
36.2 years. Most of 
the respondents were 
white (66.7%); 
African American 
(3.4%), Asian/Asian 
Pacific American 
(2.7%), Hispanic 
(16.7%), Native 
American/Alaskan 
Native (5.9%), 
Multiracial (3%) and 
“Other” (.6%). 35.1% 
was single, 30% 
divorced, 28.5% 
married, 4.7% 
“partnered,” and 1.7% 
widowed. 
75.6% of respondents 
have children. 
provided at 18 
domestic violence 
victim service 
agencies in 
Washington State—
five, seven, and six 
agencies 
respectively over a 
3-year period. 
(pre-test survey and 
post-test survey) 
(women). Pre-
tests were filled 
out by 479 
respondents and 
387 (80.8%) filled 
out post-tests 
taken into 
consideration 
Fox and 
Tokunaga, 
2015; USA; 
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• To test a model 
synthesizing 
attachment, 
investment model 
variables, and 
post-dissolution 
emotional distress 
as predictors of 
interpersonal 
surveillance of 
one’s ex-partner 
on Facebook after 
a breakup 
A large 
Midwestern 
university and 
Convenience 
sampling (were 
offered course 
credit for 
completing 
the survey) 
Participants aged 18–
42 years (M= 20.34 
years); White/ 
European/European-
American (n = 342; 
79.4%); Black/ 
African/ African 
American (n = 21; 
4.9%); Asian/Asian-
American (n = 25; 
5.8%); Latino/a/ 
Hispanic (n = 10; 
2.3%); multiracial (n 
= 25; 5.8%); or other 
(n = 5; 1.2%); 
Heterosexual (n = 
415; 96.3%), gay/ 
lesbian (n = 8; 1.9%), 
or bisexual 
(n = 7; 1.6%). One 
participant declined to 
report sexual 
orientation.  
Online survey Confirmatory factor 
analysis using SAS 
v9.4 
431 participants 
(150 male and 
281 female) 
Facebook users  
Institutional 
Review Board 
approval was 
obtained for the 
study 
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Freed et al., 
2017; USA; 
Qualitative 
study 
Strategies, 
Facilitators, 
Barriers;  
• To develop a 
nuanced 
understanding of 
the role played by 
digital 
technologies in 
the IPV 
ecosystem 
4 Family Justice 
Centers 
The Deputy 
Director helped us 
by making a wide 
range of 
professionals 
aware of the 
opportunity to 
participate in our 
study. To recruit 
survivors, the 
Deputy Director 
placed fliers (in 
English and 
Spanish) that 
described the 
study in the 
FJC reception 
area. 
Professionals: 35 
Female, 5 Male; Age 
between 22 & 56 
(average 33 y); 16 
Case managers/case 
workers, 10 Social 
workers, 8 Attorneys/ 
paralegals, 6 Police 
officers 
Survivors: 32 
females; Age between 
25 & 55 (average 35 
y); From Argentina, 
Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, 
Peru, Russia, UK, 
USA; 5 did not 
complete high school, 
10 completed high 
school, 5 attended 
college, did not 
graduate, 7 completed 
college, 5 unreported 
Semi-structured 
interviews (nine 
focus groups with 
32 survivors) 
Thematic analysis 
 
72 participants: 40 
IPV professionals 
and nine focus 
groups with 32 
survivors of 
IPV 
Authors 
received IRB 
approval for all 
study 
procedures and 
permission from 
the OCDV 
before 
beginning the 
research 
Halligan et al., 
2013; USA; 
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, Barriers; 
• To assess the 
degree to which 
individuals 
involved in 
abusive 
relationships 
would report that 
technology in the 
form of text 
messages, email, 
and Facebook 
would impair 
their ability to 
terminate the 
relationship. 
A large 
southeastern 
university 
Convenience 
sampling 
The majority of 
respondents (81%) 
were female, white 
(67% with 19% black, 
12% Hispanic) and 
heterosexual 
(91%). Over half 
(64%) were either 
first or second year 
undergraduates with 
the mean age 19.8. 
A 42 item Internet 
questionnaire 
Descriptive 
statistics  
259 
undergraduates 
Study was 
approved by the 
Institutional 
Review Board 
at a large south-
eastern 
university 
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Lindsay et al., 
2013; USA; 
Qualitative 
study 
Strategies, 
Facilitators;  
• To explore a 
prototype smart 
phone application 
(“app”) that is a 
safety decision 
aid for female 
survivors of 
dating violence. 
Craigslist, 
Facebook, student 
listservs, campus 
flyers, and word-
of-mouth were 
used to recruit 
female college 
students who 
identified as 
survivors of 
dating violence. 
Convenience 
sampling 
Participants from all 
four research sites 
were English-
speaking female 
college students, ages 
18–25 (M = 21.26), 
who reported that they 
experienced dating 
violence while in 
college. Participants’ 
self-identified racial/ 
ethnic background as 
52.6% White, 23.7% 
Hispanic /Latina, 
7.9% African 
American, 13.2% 
Multiracial, and 2.6% 
Other. All participants 
were currently college 
students—the 
majority was 
undergraduate, 
including 5.2% 
freshman, 13.2% 
sophomores, 21.1% 
juniors, 28.9% 
seniors, and 10.1% 
graduate students. 
Focus group 
discussions or 
individual interview 
Content analysis 
Transcripts were 
uploaded into 
Dedoose 
(http://www.dedoos
e.com/) qualitative 
software to facilitate 
the qualitative 
descriptive analysis. 
38 participants 
(women) 
Study 
procedures were 
consistent 
across all sites 
and approved by 
IRBs at Johns 
Hopkins 
University, 
Arizona State 
University, 
University of 
Missouri-
Columbia, and 
Oregon Health 
and Science 
University. 
Matthews et al., 
2017; USA; 
Qualitative 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• To provide a 
framework for 
organizing 
survivors' 
technology 
practices and 
challenges into 
three phases: 
physical control, 
escape, and life 
apart. 
Agencies served 
homeless adults 
and survivors of 
IPA (intimate 
partner abuse) 
Agency staff 
recruited 
participants 
through personal 
contact 
No demographic 
information due to a 
privacy precaution 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Inductive analysis 15 participants 
(14 female, 1 
male) 
All participants 
gave informed 
consent; the 
incentives were 
approved by the 
agencies and 
our 
organization’s 
internal 
ethics review 
Marcum et al., 
2017; USA; 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• To investigate 
theoretical 
A mid-sized 
university 
in the Southeast 
A sample of 5000 
undergraduate and 
graduate students 
The sample was 28 % 
female. The average 
Survey Descriptive 
statistics; 
890 fully 
completed 
surveys of 
Consent 
forms were 
obtained; No 
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Cross-sectional 
study 
predictors of 
cyberstalking in a 
sample of 
university 
students by 
applying General 
Theory of Crime 
and Social 
Learning Theory. 
was randomly 
chosen by the 
university’s 
Office of 
Institutional 
Research, 
Assessment, and 
Planning. 
age of the sample was 
18 to 
20 years old. Eighty 9 
% of the sample was 
white. The average 
sexual orientation was 
heterosexual. 
correlation analysis; 
regression analysis 
individuals in 
relationships were 
returned (17.8 % 
response rate) 
further 
information 
about ethical 
approval 
Reed et al., 
2016; USA; 
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• To explore 
whether digital 
media are a 
context and tool 
for dating 
violence among 
college students 
by assessing 
victimization and 
perpetration of 
potentially 
abusive digital 
dating 
behaviours, 
examining gender 
differences in 
these behaviours, 
and comparing 
the experience of 
digital behaviours 
to other forms of 
dating violence. 
An introductory 
psychology 
course at a large 
university in the 
Midwestern 
United States 
Convenience 
sampling 
Participants ranged in 
age from 17-22 (M = 
18.66), with the 
majority (87.9%) 
being 17, 18, or 19. 
Although most 
participants identified 
their ethnicity as 
White (72.1%), others 
identified as Asian 
(14.8%), Black 
(6.8%), or 
Hispanic/Latino 
(3.8%). 
Surveys were 
administered in 
paper-and-pencil 
form to participants 
in groups of 
approximately 10 
people, seated 
spaced out around 
the room, who were 
given clipboards to 
use for added 
privacy. Participants 
were asked to place 
their survey in a 
brown envelope 
before returning it 
to the experimenter 
to further ensure 
anonymity. 
Descriptive 
statistics; t-test; chi 
square; Anova 
365 
undergraduate 
students (57% 
female) 
Consent 
forms were 
obtained; No 
further 
information 
about ethical 
approval 
Ross et al., 
2016; USA; 
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• Α closer 
examination of 
the relation 
between sexual 
and sexting 
coercion, as well 
as between 
coercion 
victimization and 
sexual behaviour, 
A midsized, 
Midwestern 
university 
Convenience 
sampling 
Most were college 
freshmen (62%) or 
sophomores (25%), 
with an average age 
of 20.43 years (SD = 
4.64). Most were 
Caucasian (83%), 
followed by Hispanic 
(5%), African 
American (5%), Asian 
(4%), and 3% who 
Online survey Chi square; 
correlations; 
MANCOVA 
885 
undergraduates 
(301 men and 584 
women) 
Consent 
forms were 
obtained; No 
further 
information 
about ethical 
approval 
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and determining 
whether sexting 
coercion is 
associated with 
negative 
outcomes for 
victims, above 
and beyond what 
is reported by 
those who 
experience more 
traditional forms 
of IPA 
exclusively. 
identified as biracial, 
Native American, or 
“other.” 
Rothman et al., 
2009; USA; 
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• To estimate the 
prevalence of e-
mail use among 
residents of 
battered women’s 
shelters in 
Massachusetts 
• To investigate 
whether, to their 
knowledge, 
shelter residents’ 
e-mail accounts 
had ever been 
accessed by a 
nonauthorized 
intimate partner 
• To explore 
whether shelter 
residents would 
welcome follow-
up contact by 
researchers or 
shelters advocates 
via their e-mail 
accounts. 
11 battered 
women’s shelters 
in Massachusetts 
Convenience 
sampling 
The majority of our 
sample was in their 
middle or late 20s 
(40%), was Black or 
Hispanic (51%), and 
did not have a college 
education (72%) 
Survey (16 original 
questions, 7 
demographic and 9 
pertaining to e-mail 
use and comfort 
with shelter contact 
via e-mail. 
Descriptive 
statistics  
57 participants 
(women) 
Ethical issues 
haven’t been 
taken into 
consideration 
Tarzia et al., 
2017; Australia; 
Strategies, 
Facilitators;  
Advertisements 
on the University 
of Melbourne 
Convenience 
sampling 
Age between 20 and 
25 years participated 
Two of the groups 
Semi-structure 
interviews  
Transcripts of the 
focus groups were 
19 participants 
(women) 
Ethics approval 
for this research 
was granted by 
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Qualitative 
study 
• To explore the 
views of young 
Australian 
women on using 
a website or 
application to 
address IPV 
online student 
portal, Twitter, 
Facebook, 
Gumtree, 
Craigslist 
Australia, and 
various women’s 
health websites 
(n = 4 and n = 5) were 
open to women aged 
16–50, and two were 
open only to women 
aged 16–25 (n = 8 and 
n = 5). 
(Four focus groups 
between April and 
August 2014) 
entered into the 
software program 
NVivo 10 
The University 
of 
Melbourne 
Human 
Research Ethics 
Committee 
Truman, 2011; 
USA; 
Cross-sectional 
study 
Strategies, 
Facilitators, 
Barriers;  
To examine both 
intimate and 
nonintimate stalking 
and the behaviour of 
cyberstalking 
The National 
Crime 
Victimization 
Survey: Stalking 
Victimization 
Supplement 
(United States 
Department of 
Justice (USDOJ), 
Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (BJS), 
2009). 
“Rotating panel” 
design (randomly 
selected)  
The age range of all 
victims (stalking and 
harassment victims) 
was 18 to 90 with a 
mean of 40.54. Race 
was coded as white, 
black, American 
Indian/Alaska Native, 
Asian, 
Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander, or multiple 
races (any 
combination and up to 
4-5 races – this was 
recoded into one 
category of 
multiracial). The 
majority of all, 
stalking, and 
harassment victims 
were white. 
Paper-and-pencil 
interviewing (both 
in person and by 
telephone with the 
responses entered 
on a paper 
instrument) and 
computer-assisted 
telephone 
interviewing 
Descriptive 
statistics; Bivariate 
analyses; ANOVA; 
Multiple t-tests; 
Linear and logistic 
regression analyses  
1,683 victims 
(67.6% females 
and 32.4% males) 
It has been 
taken from a 
pre-existing 
dataset where 
consent was 
obtained 
Woodlock, 
2017; Australia; 
Qualitative 
study 
Strategies, Barriers;  
• To determine 
whether 
technology-
facilitated 
stalking is an 
issue for women 
experiencing 
domestic violence 
and whether 
mobile 
technologies 
(such as 
smartphones) 
Authors 
advertised the 
victim survey on 
the DVRCV 
website, 
Facebook, 
Twitter, and 
gumtree.com.au 
In addition, they 
displayed posters 
at universities and 
in health centers. 
Convenience 
sampling 
The average age of 
the women was 35 
years. 92% (n = 42) 
identified as Anglo-
Australian, 91% (n = 
41) as heterosexual, 
9% (n = 5) as 
bisexual, 9% (n = 4) 
as having a disability, 
and 37% (n = 17) as a 
parent with children. 
Online surveys 
(worker survey & 
victim survey) 
included closed and 
open questions, a 
form of multiple-
methods research 
that captures 
quantitative and 
qualitative data 
Authors used 
NVivo to code the 
answers to the open 
questions in the two 
surveys and used 
thematic analysis to 
categorize the 
findings 
152 workers in 
the domestic 
violence sector & 
46 women  
Research is 
guided by 
internal policies 
and consultation 
with external 
experts to 
ensure that 
international 
ethical 
standards for 
working with 
victims of 
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
present further 
opportunities for 
the perpetration 
of stalking and 
domestic violence 
against women. 
domestic 
violence are 
followed 
 
 
Table A2. Description of the covert strategies 
Strategy  Type of 
methodology 
 
Study  Description of the strategy Evidence of effectiveness 
Presence Online Cross-sectional (Bosch and Schumm, 
2004) 
Access to resources such as computer/ internet/ e-
mail 
Access to resources was associated significantly and negatively 
with previous abuse, whether correlated with previous abuse or 
used to predict previous abuse in the regression model. Thus, we 
can infer that most of the independent variables would have an 
indirect impact on previous abuse, operating through access to 
resources. (p. 366) 
(Chaulk and Jones, 
2011) 
Communication through Facebook Following: (e.g., Joining the same group(s)/network(s)/ 
event(s) as you, adding the same applications, checking out the 
things you have done through your Mini-feed). 
Intruding uninvited into interactions: (e.g., reading your wall 
conversations (posts and replies). (p.248) (see Table 5, p.252-
253) 
We find evidence of behaviours identified in the research on 
stalking and relational intrusion and find that many of them are 
facilitated by the Facebook application. (p.250) 
(Halligan et al., 2013) Communication through text messages, e-mail, 
Facebook 
Respondents needing to leave an abusive relationship more 
frequently identified with those areas that would be perceived as 
a barrier (e.g. receiving text message that called the respondent 
names). Hence they were staying in contact with the abusive 
partner. (p.647) 
Qualitative  (Choo et al., 2015) Computer Interventions S4 (age 23): It’s like you wanted to know, and you’re gonna 
reflect on my answers, and you’re gonna help me out. That’s 
how I see it…It still made me feel like I was somebody, I was a 
person, I was out there, somebody seen me, like that’s—it was 
yeah. Made me feel good about myself. 
Three participants described therapeutic or empowering 
experiences when divulging partner abuse on the computer. 
(p.4) 
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In fact, many participants felt that the computer made it easier to 
discuss these topics than face-to-face with a person. One 
participant (S14, age 20) stated that if a doctor asked her about 
partner abuse, “I tell them that’s not what I came here for,” but 
answered the screening questions “because it was on the 
computer.” (p.5) 
(Dimond et al., 2011) Communication through Facebook Although she does not put any information on Facebook, Janelle 
tells us that she still visits her sister’s page, to see what she is 
doing and to feel more in touch. Janelle feels that her sister 
updates her page more frequently for Janelle’s benefit.(p.416) 
In a time of isolation and separation from their social network,  
sites such as Facebook provide survivors with much needed 
connection to family and friends. (p.419) 
(Freed et al., 2017) Limited access/ use of computer/ internet “[Google is] just trying to track me . . . Literally I can go back 
for months and see where I was at. I had to disable everything. I 
would not even put information in my phone for a Google 
account. I’m back to using a paper calendar.” (P2, Client) (p.11) 
(Lindsay et al., 2013) Personalized safety plan Participants were receptive to the “My Safety” portion of the 
app. The instant nature of the feedback and the color-coded 
levels that indicate level of danger in an abusive relationship 
were particularly helpful: “I like how it’s broken down like that: 
extreme danger zone, severe danger zone, increased danger 
zone, variable danger zone, from red to greenish.” Women also 
liked the scoring: What helped me out was the last, the scoring, 
how it scores you. It asks you specific information or specific 
questions about it and then it gives you a score. I think that 
helped me just to see what the level was. Participants found the 
“My Plan” section of the app an important resource for safety, 
stating that creating a plan with resources seemed helpful: “The 
whole idea of having a plan would be really useful.” (p.379) 
Participants thought that the “My Plan” section was a good way 
to bring all of the information “together at the end because it’s 
assessing everything and then ends with a plan, which puts all 
that into perspective.” (p.383) 
(Matthews et al., 2017) Limited access/ use of computer/ internet Due to abusers’ physical control of devices, multiple 
survivors limited or avoided using devices and/or accounts the 
abuser could access. “I simply stopped using the laptop at home. 
And the phone. That's why I went to the library to use the 
computer.”  
An ongoing practice in life apart was to limit or avoid sharing 
information online. “With my [child], I'll put a picture up, but I 
just make sure I chop the background, [...] the last picture I 
posted, [my child] was at [city], we were at the [city place]. You 
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can't really tell what [place] it is. [...]. You could see cement and 
chairs, but you can't really see the background.” -P5 (p.2196) 
(Tarzia et al., 2017) Websites and applications  Websites and apps were perceived as being more objective and 
unbiased than friends or family (p.206) 
Maybe have a forum where people post what they’re going 
through, that could give a sense that I’m not going through this 
alone. There are so many people who are going through the 
same thing. (FG 1); I feel like young women nowadays always 
sort of go to the Internet first, just to check out … is this 
normal? … It’s nicer just to know there are other people out 
there who are asking these questions as well. (FG 2) (p.206) 
Granular 
Control 
Qualitative (Dimond et al., 2011) Using alias When Janelle arrived at the shelter, she also got a new prepaid 
cell phone, but registered it under an alias, rather than using her 
real name. (p.416) 
‘‘Yeah so one day I just went and got a new metro and so it is so 
easy to get a metro, you don’t even have to an ID and stuff. . 
.you can go in and say you are Miss Beyonce Knowles and they 
don’t care.’’ (p. 418) 
For Gina and Janelle, it was not worth the risk to use their real 
names again, as they feared that their information could show up 
on other phones or on the Internet. (p.418) 
(Freed et al., 2017) Limited access/ use of computer/ internet “[Google is] just trying to track me . . . Literally I can go back 
for months and see where I was at. I had to disable everything. I 
would not even put information in my phone for a Google 
account. I’m back to using a paper calendar.” (P2, Client) (p.11) 
Common software advice included: Limiting or restricting the 
sharing of pictures, blocking other users on social media and 
deleting or shutting down online accounts. Common hardware 
advice included: throwing away the device, changing the SIM 
card or wireless plan, performing a factory reset on the device, 
and turning off services like location and WiFi (p.14) 
(Matthews et al., 2017) Limited access/ use of computer/ internet Due to abusers’ physical control of devices, multiple 
survivors limited or avoided using devices and/or accounts the 
abuser could access. “I simply stopped using the laptop at home. 
And the phone. That's why I went to the library to use the 
computer.”  
An ongoing practice in life apart was to limit or avoid sharing 
information online. “With my [child], I'll put a picture up, but I 
just make sure I chop the background, [...] the last picture I 
posted, [my child] was at [city], we were at the [city place]. You 
can't really tell what [place] it is. [...]. You could see cement and 
chairs, but you can't really see the background.” -P5 (p.2196) 
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Some types of privacy and security options that were 
particularly useful to survivors were those that enabled them to 
safely and privately use alternate devices (e.g., using private 
browsing on someone else’s device), effectively control their 
digital traces (e.g., delete content), and maintain ambiguity 
and/or plausible deniability in their use of technology (p.2197) 
 (Tarzia et al., 2017) Protect privacy These included password protection for the app or website; 
disguising the app or website as something unrelated to IPV; 
automatic log out of the app or website if a woman does not use 
her phone within a set period of time; and providing information 
to users about how to clear their cache or browser history. 
(p.210) 
NRS (Finn and Atkinson, 
2009) 
Anonymous accounts and keeping secret the location Sending email without giving away your location; Creating 
anonymous email account that does not give out your private  
information (Table 4; p.57) 
Cross-sectional (Chaulk and Jones, 
2011) 
Facebook privacy settings Users of social networking sites are well-advised to be selective 
in their criteria for adding ‘friends’ and be wary of individuals 
that begin to exhibit higher forms of relational intrusion 
behaviours. For example, Facebook allows one to restrict the 
majority of their profile to friends only. Currently, Facebook 
does allow users to block some individuals and to limit profile 
viewing to others. 
“Ever since I had Facebook my privacy settings have been on 
the highest setting. Unless I have accepted the person as my 
friend, they cannot see my profile. I only accept friend requests 
from people I know to a degree higher than simply knowing 
their name. Unfortunately, people are not as careful with their 
privacy as I am.” (p.251-252) 
 (Truman, 2011) Block mechanisms  Change e-mail address; installed caller ID or call blocking; 
changed or installed new locks or security system (Table 8; 
p.59)  
Victims of intimate partner stalking installed caller ID or call 
blocking (χ2(1)=7.39; p<.01), and changed or installed new 
locks or security system (χ2(1)=21.25; p<.001). (p.79) 
Use of digital 
support tools 
and services 
RCT (Bloom et al., 2014) Online Safety Planning Intervention The tool is designed to provide women with additional rural-
specific strategies on their individualized safety plans (e.g., 
considerations for escape planning in isolated areas) based upon 
their input.  
Three of four participants (73.9%) logged in and completed the 
baseline session within a week of enrolment, with 45.7% 
completing within 24 hours. The average time to completion 
was 10.3 days (SD = 16.3 days, range = 0–68 days), with rural 
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women taking an average of 2.2 days longer than urban women 
(11.6 vs. 9.4 days, respectively). 
The average DA score was 16.1, which indicates severe danger 
in the abusive relationship, with rural women two points higher 
on average (17.3; SD = 9.6, range = 1–33) than urban women 
(15.3; SD = 9.5, range = 1–34). RAs reported that rural women 
were also typically able to identify fewer safe emergency 
contacts (friends or family members who could safely take a 
message for her) than urban women. (p.248) 
NRS (Finn and Atkinson, 
2009) 
Technology Safety Project Many respondents reported having increased awareness about 
computer safety and better understanding of how to stay safe. In 
addition, they reported gaining new or additional knowledge 
about specific technologies, especially spyware, GPS, cell 
phones, and baby monitors. Several mentioned that they would 
change some specific computer and technology behaviour as a 
result of the presentation. (p.57) 
“I won’t put my real name when signing up for services online” 
and “I’m going to take personal information off accounts and 
pass information on to residents in the shelter.” (p.57) 
The presentation was positive for many and made them feel 
safer and more protected. This knowledge was also “scary” for 
many respondents. Often there was a mix of fear and 
appreciation of the knowledge. For example, one respondent 
said, “I’m more scared now, but it’s good to know this stuff.” 
Another stated, “I will not use the computer as much.” (p.57) 
Approximately 80% of respondents found information in all 
areas to be useful, with the exception of information about 
Instant Messenger, on which more than half (59.1%) found the 
information useful. (Table 5; p.56-57) 
Qualitative (Bacchus et al., 2016) DOVE technology “DOVE really helped a lot…Some women could tell you right 
off the bat “look he beat me.” But some women could be just 
like me and it takes time. I think if they do it and the home 
visitor comes in and they’re graceful and supportive, I think it 
will help [women] a lot. I feel like it helped me a lot and to trust 
people again.” [Joanne, client, 21 years, rural, IPV+] (p.7) 
The DOVE technology eliminated this complex process of 
waiting for the right moment in the relationship to ask about or 
disclose abuse, which was advantageous to women in terms of 
being able to access help quickly. (p.9) 
An advantage of the computer tablet was its built-in safety 
mechanism, an icon that switched from the DOVE program to a 
baby video in the case of an unexpected interruption. This safety 
feature was greatly appreciated because only the home visitor 
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could reactivate DOVE with his or her unique identification 
number. (p.12) 
(Choo et al., 2015) Computer Interventions S4 (age 23): It’s like you wanted to know, and you’re gonna 
reflect on my answers, and you’re gonna help me out. That’s 
how I see it…It still made me feel like I was somebody, I was a 
person, I was out there, somebody seen me, like that’s—it was 
yeah. Made me feel good about myself. 
Three participants described therapeutic or empowering 
experiences when divulging partner abuse on the computer. 
(p.4) 
In fact, many participants felt that the computer made it easier to 
discuss these topics than face-to-face with a person. One 
participant (S14, age 20) stated that if a doctor asked her about 
partner abuse, “I tell them that’s not what I came here for,” but 
answered the screening questions “because it was on the 
computer.” (p.5) 
(Constantino et al., 
2007) 
e-mail device “MIVO” intervention Results indicated that email was a feasible and acceptable way 
to provide support and information to abused women after 
obtaining a PFA order. 
All six mother and child pairs emailed the nurse interventionist 
at least once a week; two mothers sent email three times during 
both the third and fourth weeks (p.296) 
“What do I do if he comes to pick up his belongings without 
police escort?”; “If police refuses to escort him, can he still pick 
up his belongings?”; “If he calls me at work, should I call the 
police?” (p.296) 
  (Freed et al., 2017) Protect privacy Changing passwords and password recovery questions, 
changing privacy settings (e.g., for Facebook), inspecting the 
device for unwanted apps (often by taking it to an official 
company store like the Apple store) (p.14) 
  (Lindsay et al., 2013) Personalized safety plan Participants were receptive to the “My Safety” portion of the 
app. The instant nature of the feedback and the color-coded 
levels that indicate level of danger in an abusive relationship 
were particularly helpful: “I like how it’s broken down like that: 
extreme danger zone, severe danger zone, increased danger 
zone, variable danger zone, from red to greenish.” Women also 
liked the scoring: What helped me out was the last, the scoring, 
how it scores you. It asks you specific information or specific 
questions about it and then it gives you a score. I think that 
helped me just to see what the level was. Participants found the 
“My Plan” section of the app an important resource for safety, 
stating that creating a plan with resources seemed helpful: “The 
whole idea of having a plan would be really useful.” (p.379) 
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Participants thought that the “My Plan” section was a good way  
to bring all of the information “together at the end because it’s 
assessing everything and then ends with a plan, which puts all 
that into perspective.” (p.383) 
  (Tarzia et al., 2017) Websites and applications  Websites and apps were perceived as being more objective and 
unbiased than friends or family (p.206) 
Maybe have a forum where people post what they’re going 
through, that could give a sense that I’m not going through this 
alone. There are so many people who are going through the 
same thing. (FG 1); I feel like young women nowadays always 
sort of go to the Internet first, just to check out … is this 
normal? … It’s nicer just to know there are other people out 
there who are asking these questions as well. (FG 2) (p.206) 
Stalking and 
Surveillance 
Cross-sectional (Brem et al., 2015) Facebook surveillance (mate-retention tactic) 90.1% of the sample reported looking at a partner’s Facebook 
page; 39.5% checked a partner’s statuses to see where he or she 
would be; 33.1% snooped through a partner’s private messages 
and/or chat. (p.2837) 
Items on the Jealousy and Surveillance subscale significantly 
predicted the occurrence of both psychological aggression (β = 
.30, p = .003) and physical assault (β = .26, p = .02) over and 
above the effects of offline mate-retention tactics. (p.2843) 
(Burke et al., 2011) Online monitoring behaviours: Checking call 
histories; Checking email histories; Checking mobile 
phone bills; Monitoring partner’s Facebook site; 
Using GPS device to monitor partner; Using web 
cams to monitor partner; Using hidden cams to 
monitor partner; Using spy ware to monitor partner; 
Using partner’s passwords to monitor him/her 
See Tables 2; 3; 4; 5 (p.1165-1166) 
(Chaulk and Jones) Facebook surveillance Monitoring: (e.g., constantly checking your profile for updates, 
waiting for you to come online, visiting the groups you’ve 
joined, checking out the events you'll be attending and the 
friends you've recently added, using Facebook to "keep tabs" on 
you and/or your family, looking at the photos you have posted, 
reading your Mini-feed). 
Covertly obtaining information: (e.g., using Facebook profile to 
obtain information about you, using the profiles of 
family/friends/co-workers to obtain information about you). 
(p.248) (see Table 5, p.252-253) 
For example, more than half responded that they had used 
Facebook to make contact with ex-intimates. Further, almost a 
third responded that they used Facebook to “keep tabs” on the 
person and to obtain information about the person’s activities by 
reading their wall and profile. These types of behaviours 
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represent a form of monitoring and surveillance which is 
consistent with lower forms of obsessive relational intrusion. 
(p.250) 
(Fox and Tokunaga, 
2015) 
Interpersonal electronic surveillance through 
Facebook 
Individuals who monitored their ex-partners online immediately 
following the dissolution of their relationship were more likely 
to monitor their ex-partners online currently (b = 0.60, SE = 
0.03, p < 0.001). (Table 1; p.494) 
The present results suggest that individuals most traumatized by 
a breakup are most likely to monitor their ex-partners online 
(p.495) 
(Marcum et al., 2017) Login to other’s social networking account without 
their knowledge 
The average for attempted log-in to other’s social networking 
account without their knowledge is 1.14. In the correlations, low 
self-control has a link with attempted to login (r = 0.25), but 
Hirschi’s (2004) version of self-control does not have a link 
with attempted login. Further, peer association does have a link 
with attempted login (r = 0.01). The regression analysis for low 
self-control as a correlate of attempted to login. For attempted to 
login, low self-control has a link (Beta = 0.01). (p.380) 
(Reed et al., 2016) Monitoring behaviours Results show that some behaviours, especially items such as 
“Looked at my/my partner’s private information on a computer 
or cell phone without permission,” “Monitored my/my dating 
partner’s whereabouts,” “Monitored who I/partner talk(s) to and 
who I/they am/are friends with,” are especially common in this 
sample. (Table 1; p.1564) 
(Ross et al., 2016) Sexting coercion  Correlations between sexual aggression victimization (as 
measured by the SVAWS Sexual Aggression subscale), sexual 
coercion victimization, and sexting coercion victimization (both 
measured via the SCIRS) ranged from .38 to .54 (p < .001 for 
all) for both men and women. (p.11) 
(Rothman et al., 2009) Access to e-mail Of the respondents who reported having an e-mail account (n = 
27), 77% reported that they did not give permission for anyone 
else to use their account. The majority of respondents (96%) 
reported that they checked their e-mail daily (46%) or weekly 
(38%), as opposed to monthly (4%). Respondents were most 
likely to report that they typically checked their e-mail from a 
public place 
(e.g., the library) (38%) but also reported checking their e-mail 
while at home (19%), at school (19%), at the homes of friends 
or relatives (19%), or at work (15%). In total, 81% of 
respondents reported that they checked e-mail from a place 
other than their own home (p.740) 
(Truman, 2011) Electronic monitoring  Video or digital cameras; computer spyware; listening devices/ 
bugs; GPS (Table 5; p. 49) 
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Qualitative (Dimond et al., 2011) Limited access/ use of computer/ internet Janelle says she used to have a Facebook and MySpace, but now 
she says, ‘‘My life on the Internet is over.’’ Janelle tells me that 
she used to go on Facebook every day and was very active in 
posting updates and communicating with her friends and family, 
but is no longer active on the site due to harassment and threats 
from her husband and his family (p.416) 
But she is hesitant to put any information on the Internet and 
this can be problematic, especially when trying to look for 
permanent housing, search for jobs, or submit job applications 
that typically require a social security number (SSN). Janelle 
says she is particularly afraid to enter her SSN, as she believes 
her husband may find that she is in a different state.(p.416) 
Because Tia perceived her ex to have much more technical 
prowess than her, she said she does not really go online 
anymore. She also said she is afraid to use credit cards or 
anything that might track her. (p.418) 
(Freed et al., 2017)  Monitoring behaviours  “Using technology is the fastest and easiest way, I think, for 
many of our clients’ abusers to gain access, because it’s so easy 
— when you’ve been cohabitating with somebody for so long 
— to gain access to bank accounts, social security numbers, all 
of these things via shared devices, phones, and things like that. 
Many of our clients have to sort of untangle that, as well as 
figure out which accounts have been compromised.” (P31, Case 
manager) 
Another common strategy was for the abuser to go through the 
client’s phone when they were not looking, such as while they 
were asleep or taking a shower. (p.8) 
“A lot of clients tell me that he keeps getting their password to 
their Facebook. I tell them it’s because he knows all your 
information. It’s easy to get into your password if you know the 
security questions to answer.” (P27, NYPD) (p.9) 
“He gave my child an iPad and was using that to find out what’s 
going on at home. He would use Facetime, where he gets to see 
where my child is and maybe what’s going on in the 
background. It’s like having him at home again, even though 
he’s not actually there.” (P24, Client) (p.9) 
(Matthews et al., 2017) Monitoring behaviours (Device/account controlled & 
monitored; Spyware installed; Account hijacked – 
Impersonated; Account hijacked - Locked out; 
Account monitored - Remote or unknown means) 
Abusers used this physical proximity to monitor survivors’ 
devices and accounts and, in a few cases, install spyware on 
survivors’ devices. (p.2193) 
Three participants reported that their abusers installed spyware 
on their devices to monitor their activity. “Then I took the phone 
to [a store] and they said this phone… somebody put something 
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in the phone and this person can see everything you—where you 
call, who you talk to, all the logs.” -P2 (p.2195) 
In life apart, abusers relied on digital attacks, such as account 
hijacking and online harassment. “Whenever she hacked my 
[social media] account she messaged everybody in my family 
that I didn't want her to contact, pretending to be me. [...] And 
she would try to get them to trust her [when] they definitely 
shouldn't. [...] Messaging people in my family trying to get more 
information about me.” -P13 (p.2195) 
(Woodlock, 2017) Monitoring behaviours Used text messages, phone, and so on to call her names, harass 
her, or “put her down”; Used mobile technology to check her 
location; Impersonated her in emails, text messages, and/or 
social media; Tracked her via GPS (e.g., using applications such 
as Find My Friends); Checked her text messages without her 
permission (Table 1; p. 591) 
My client’s ex-partner has tracked her down after following her 
Facebook use. He assaulted her, stole her phone, and accessed 
her Facebook [account]. He has changed her passwords, and she 
is now not able to access her own account. He is contacting all 
her friends and supports, pretending to be her. This has resulted 
in her becoming very isolated. He has allegedly sent sexual 
messages to male friends in her account, resulting in the client 
feeling ashamed and powerless. The client has reported the 
incident, but police have not been able to find the respondent. 
(p.596) 
NRS (Finn and Atkinson, 
2009) 
Monitoring behaviours 25.1% of women had their browser history monitored; 23.6% 
had been repeatedly threatened, insulted or harassed by email; 
18% had someone monitor their emails, and 17% had someone 
use their PIN or password to gain access to a private email 
account; 11.5% had someone pretended to be them in an email 
using their personal account. 9.4% had someone pretended to be 
them in a chat room using their personal screen name; 9.4% had 
someone used their Social Security number or financial 
information to buy things online without their knowledge (p.56) 
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Table A3. Description of the technology which enables concealed and supportive behaviours related to IPV 
Facilitator Type of 
methodology 
 
Study Description of the facilitator Evidence of facilitator  
Digital devices Cross-sectional (Bosch and Schumm, 
2004) 
Computer with access to the internet/ e-mail Access to resources is facilitated by a variety of types of support 
and appears to reduce abuse during the partner relationship and, 
indirectly, when partners are no longer living together. (p.367) 
RCT (Bloom et al., 2014) Computer The most common self-reported location of the safe computer 
used for both rural and urban women was at home. A higher 
percentage of rural women (63.2%) reported using a home 
computer compared with their urban counterparts (48.4%), and a 
lower percentage of rural women used a computer at a friend’s or 
family member’s house (25.3% vs. 34.3%, respectively) (p.248) 
NRS (Finn and Atkinson, 
2009) 
Computer The vast majority of the 479 respondents (92.9%) has access to 
and uses a computer. Of those, 58.7% use a computer at home, 
43.6% at the library, 39.2% at work, 14.4% at a community 
center, and 38% use a computer at another location (such as a 
friend’s house, domestic violence organization or coffee shop). 
(p.55) 
55% of respondents view the computer as an important way to 
research safety. (Table 2; p.55) 
Qualitative (Bacchus et al., 2016) Computer tablet (facilitates trust establishment; 
offers a greater sense of anonymity and privacy) 
“If I did not trust her I would not have done this…if that were the 
case then I would like the tablet. Then I could have answered the 
questions and I don’t have to worry if she had seen them.” 
[Kimberley, client, 20 years, rural, IPV+] 
The computer tablet appeared to offer women a greater sense of 
anonymity and privacy, thereby encouraging more openness in 
answering the abuse questions. 
“There are just some things you feel ashamed saying, no matter 
how trustworthy that person…And with a computer there’s no 
emotion…and you can just say whatever you need to say and you 
won’t feel like you’re being judged…it was like a security 
blanket.” [Lisa, client, 20 years, rural, IPV+] 
“A lot of people don’t like to talk and express themselves so [the 
computer] brings it more out of a person even if they’re afraid.” 
[Jennifer, client, 30 years, urban, IPV+] 
“Maybe us asking those questions could be the first time it’s ever 
been brought up. So if they feel safe enough to do it on the tablet, 
feeling like it’s a little anonymous, it starts to break down those 
walls and maybe next time they’ll want to talk about it.” [Coleen, 
home visitor, 27 years, rural] (p.8) 
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(Choo et al., 2015) Computer; mobile Computers/mobile devices were described as acceptable and 
accessible for drug use and partner abuse advice, particularly 
when social supports are unavailable or when information must 
be accessed privately and safely. (p.6) 
Over half (eleven of seventeen) of the participants said they 
frequently used a computer or mobile device, describing a wide 
variety of reasons for use, including entertainment, social 
networking, and general information. The social connections, in 
particular, seemed important to the women; one stay at home 
mom (S15, age 27), described her mobile device as her only 
connection to the outside world. Ten of seventeen participants 
stated they used the computer/mobile device for health 
information for themselves or friends or family. Importantly, a 
few women defined distinctions between mobile device and 
computer use, with computers associated with productivity, 
school and work, and cell-phones related to social connections 
and immediate, practical functions such as finding places and 
getting needed facts or information. (p.8) 
(Constantino et al., 
2007) 
MIVO (e-mail device) The mothers and their children utilized the MIVO without 
difficulty. Feedback from the mothers and children was quite 
positive. (p.296) 
(Lindsay et al., 2013) Mobile device/ smartphone College-age women would respond positively to a technology-
based safety decision aid, such as this, that could be accessed 
from a smartphone or other mobile device. (p.385) 
(Tarzia et al., 2017) Smartphone  Most of the young women highlighted the benefits that the 
Internet and smartphones could offer in terms of providing ready 
access to support when experiencing IPV. “If you have your 
phone with you, that means it opens up a lot …. You don’t have 
to go to a friend, you don’t have to go to a safe place or a specific 
place to access information, it can be 24/7, anywhere you are, 
which is great. (FG 3) (p.210) 
Digital tools 
and services 
Cross-sectional (Truman, 2011) Digital tools and services  Change e-mail address; installed caller ID or call blocking; 
changed or installed new locks or security system (Table 8; p.59)  
NRS (Finn and Atkinson, 
2009) 
Phone and computer-related services The vast majority of respondents are comfortable using phone 
and computer-related services. Very few are comfortable with 
GPS, TTY/TDD services, or PDAs. (Table 1; p. 55) 
Qualitative (Freed et al., 2017) Google search  A common strategy for learning about technology was simply 
searching the web for information during or between client 
meetings. This could be both for general technology information, 
such as learning about new apps, or for digital privacy/safety 
specific problems, such as how to prevent location tracking. 
(p.12) 
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“I get most of my safety tip sheets from the NNEDV, the Safety 
Net Project. So if they have something that’s helpful, great, I can 
print it out and give it to a client. But if they don’t, then we’re 
kind of trying to figure it out, and so I’m like Googling stuff.” 
(P14, Staff Attorney) 
These organizations provide a number of useful documents, 
including high-level summaries of how to think about digital 
privacy and safety, guides about privacy settings for Facebook, 
and discussion of security practices such as picking strong 
passwords. (p.12-13) 
(Lindsay et al., 2013) Mobile application Participants generally agreed that using a mobile phone 
application, such as this, was a useful, innovative, and effective 
way to get information to college students about dating violence 
and safety in relationships.  
“It helps you organize your mind because when you’re in the 
situation, you don’t really know how to feel … there’s so much 
going on, you don’t really know how to categorize things. When 
[the app does] it for you, it just helps you put yourself in order, 
and have more control on your life. 
When something’s happening to you like that, you feel like 
you’re out of control and you can’t—you don’t know where to 
go. You don’t know what to do. You’re just so confused, so I 
think it helps. (p.378) 
(Matthews et al., 2017) Software  “[A software product] let me know when someone's trying to 
hack into my account. Then I used the [2-factor authentication] 
method and I change the password. So that is so cool for me. It's 
a couple times. I think the last time was my ex. You know he 
thought he could just check my email and see what I'm doing.” -
P11 (p.2196) 
(Tarzia et al., 2017) Web applications The young women felt that seeking help anonymously via the 
Internet or an app would be easier in many ways than face-to-
face. (p.205) 
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Table A4. Description of the technology which deters concealed and supported behaviours related to IPV 
Barrier Type of 
methodology 
 
Study Description of the barrier Evidence of barrier 
Social 
networking 
sites 
Cross-sectional (Brem et al., 2015) Facebook 90.1% of the sample reported looking at a partner’s Facebook 
page; 39.5% checked a partner’s statuses to see where he or she 
would be; 33.1% snooped through a partner’s private messages 
and/or chat. (p.2837) 
Items on the Jealousy and Surveillance subscale significantly 
predicted the occurrence of both psychological aggression (β = 
.30, p = .003) and physical assault (β = .26, p = .02) over and 
above the effects of offline mate-retention tactics. (p.2843) 
(Burke et al., 2011) Facebook Monitoring partner’s Facebook site (Tables 2; 3; 4; 5) (p.1165-
1166) 
(Chaulk and Jones, 
2011) 
Facebook We find evidence of behaviours identified in the research on 
stalking and relational intrusion and find that many of them are 
facilitated by the Facebook application. (see Table 1; 3) (p.250) 
(Fox and Tokunaga, 
2015) 
Facebook (or similar social networking sites) SNSs and other mediated interpersonal channels will continue to 
play integral roles in the escalation, maintenance, and dissolution 
of romantic relationships. (p.496) 
(Marcum et al., 2017) Social media The average for attempted log-in to social media is 1.14. In the 
sample, 96 % of the sample used social media or social network 
sites. (p.380) 
Qualitative (Dimond et al., 2011) Facebook (or similar social networking sites) Sites such as Facebook were also used as an extension of abuse 
after leaving for three of the women. As we learned from Janelle 
in the opening story, her abuser used Facebook to harass, 
threaten, and to try to get information. Thus, technologies can be 
helpful, but sites such as Facebook do not easily provide the kind 
of privacy that domestic violence survivors require. (p.417) 
(Freed et al., 2017) Social media  “Especially in intimate partner cases, there is a lot of overlap in 
people’s social circles. A lot of family overlap, especially if there 
are children in common. So now with social media you get a lot 
of influence being put on people. For example, now the abuser’s 
family is posting on Facebook, ‘Why’d you get my brother 
locked up? Why’d you get my son locked up?’ ” (P28, Attorney) 
“I try to make sure that when I post it is only seen by my friends, 
but I realized that there is also a setting where it could be seen by 
friends of friends. I want to turn that off but I do not know how.” 
(P9, Client) (p.9) 
In addition to enabling abusers to search for information on how 
to abuse, the Internet also enables abusers to find information that 
can help them locate a victim. Personal and organizational 
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websites, blogs, social media platforms, and more, often provide 
names, photos, contact information, and other details. (p.10) 
(Woodlock, 2017) Facebook Workers and victims wrote of perpetrators using social media, 
specifically Facebook, to relentlessly monitor and abuse women. 
Even when a woman blocks her partner or ex-partner from her 
Facebook account, he may continue to monitor her through the 
Facebook pages of shared friends, 
family, or even their children (p.593) 
Workers identified Facebook as a platform that perpetrators use 
to proxy stalk women. (p.594) 
Digital devices Cross-sectional (Bacchus et al., 2016)  Computer tablet (might affect interpersonal 
communication; technological issues; concerns 
about confidentiality) 
“You know if in fact relationship building is so crucial…you 
know my only concern was the client goes off, they complete the 
forms, they do all the work on the tablet themselves. They hand 
the tablet back. Would the community worker truly sit and still 
have communication with that client or would they have let the 
tablet do all the work for them…would there be a loss in that 
relationship?” [Program designer 02] (p.9) 
“You need to use your tablet often for the tablet to keep 
connectivity with the Google Play Store and sometimes these 
tablets sit in a drawer and they miss updates because they’re 
turned off. They lose the token that Google gives the tablet to 
keep it authenticated…If you don’t have that token you will not 
access the market, you cannot get your update. So skipping 
updates is really bad when you’re dealing with this kind of 
research software…I would have given them a bit more network 
knowledge. We didn’t teach them about that…I mean they’re 
nurses and they’re not supposed to know those things. [Program 
designer 01] 
“Well I kinda had this thought in my head…what if it’s not going 
to the people they said it’s going to and then he does find me and 
then I’m screwed…If I were to tell somebody [in person], I think 
it would go directly to that person or the people that need to 
know about it. But with the tablet, technology’s kinda finicky 
sometimes and it has glitches and you don’t really know where 
it’s going.” [Lisa, client, 20 years, rural, IPV+] 
“Everything you put on the computer everyone can see it. It’s 
probably better letting the home visitor do it because Miss Laura 
[home visitor] said that if somebody tries to ask her about me, 
she can’t tell them.” [Amy, client, 16 years, rural, IPV+] (p.12) 
(Burke et al., 2011) Monitoring devices Using GPS device to monitor partner; Using web cams to 
monitor partner; Using hidden cams to monitor partner (Tables 2; 
3; 4; 5) (p.1165-1166) 
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(Halligan et al., 2013) Phone There was no significant difference (p-values > 0.05) between 
abused and abuse prone groups in terms of technology access and 
knowledge of phone features. Almost 58% of total respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed with the notion that they can’t be 
separated from their cell phones. However, respondents needing 
to leave an abusive relationship more frequently identified with 
those areas that would be perceived as a barrier (e.g. receiving 
text message that called the respondent names). Hence they were 
staying in contact with the abusive partner. And, those who were 
“abuse prone” were more likely to stay in abusive relationships 
even though parents and friends disapproved. (p.646-647) 
Technology does seem to be a barrier for extricating oneself from 
an abusive relationship. Third, abuse prone individuals seem just 
as vulnerable to being trapped by technology. (p.647) 
(Reed et al., 2016) Mobile phone “My dating partner(s) monitored who I talk to and who I am 
friends with using the Internet or a cell phone” 
“I monitored who my dating partner(s) talk to and who he/she is 
friends with using the Internet or a cell 
phone” (p.1561) 
(Truman, 2011) Video or digital cameras; GPS device; listening 
devices 
Video or digital cameras; GPS; listening devices/ bugs (Table 5; 
p. 49) 
Qualitative (Choo et al., 2015) Computer Many did not own a computer/mobile device and could only use 
one at public places or when they could borrow one. Others 
possessed outdated equipment with limited capabilities or were 
unable to pay for an Internet connection. Although none of the 
women explicitly described partners monitoring or limiting their 
use of devices as part of abusive/controlling behaviours, one 
participant (S4, age 23) related being unable to afford to replace 
her phone after it was broken in a violent argument: “I don’t have 
a phone… when I had my phone it broke because of the, like, 
arguing and stuff like that, start slamming stuff, throwing stuff, 
things like that.” (p.9) 
(Dimond et al., 2011) GPS device; Computer; mobile phone For example, Heather’s abuser sent her a text stating that he 
knew where she was because her phone has GPS on it. 
Tia told me that her ex-boyfriend had been stalking her and she 
did not know how he found out where she was, but attributed his 
computer skills to his ability to stalk her. ‘‘I mean he is very 
computer savvy. He knows how to make a computer. Literally 
like from scratch.’’ Whether or not the phones had GPS or the 
abusers were able to track them, participants were not willing to 
risk their safety by keeping their phones. (p.417) 
(Freed et al., 2017) Phone “Using technology is the fastest and easiest way, I think, for 
many of our clients’ abusers to gain access, because it’s so easy 
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— when you’ve been cohabitating with somebody for so long — 
to gain access to bank accounts, social security numbers, all of 
these things via shared devices, phones, and things like that. 
Many of our clients have to sort of untangle that, as well as figure 
out which accounts have been compromised.” (P31, Case 
manager)Another common strategy was for the abuser to go 
through the client’s phone when they were not looking, such as 
while they were asleep or taking a shower. (8) 
“[…] Like, my phone is very hot, the battery disappears 
constantly. They think, ‘Well, I just need a new phone’. No. 
Probably someone has spyware on your phone, but you don’t 
know that.” (P28, Attorney). (p.10) 
(Woodlock, 2017) Monitoring devices (i.e. GPS) An additional key finding was the use of GPS mobile technology 
to engender this sense of omnipresence. Perpetrators usually 
achieve this by downloading mobile applications (“apps”) to 
women’s phones or hiding a GPS device in their vehicles. A 
participant in the worker survey illustrated the numerous ways in 
which perpetrators use GPS (p.593) 
Digital tools 
and services 
Cross-sectional (Burke et al., 2011) Monitoring tools and services Checking call histories; Checking email histories; Using spy 
ware to monitor partner; Using partner’s passwords to monitor 
him/her (Tables 2; 3; 4; 5) (p.1165-1166) 
(Rothman et al., 2009) e-mail monitoring    Of the 27 respondents who reported having an e-mail account, 1 
(4%) reported that she knew that her e-mail account had been 
broken into by a dating partner, and 
4 additional respondents were “not sure” if this had ever occurred 
(15%) (p.741) 
(Truman, 2011) Spyware Computer spyware (Table 5; p. 49) 
Qualitative (Dimond et al., 2011) Blocking Blocking unwanted calls and text messages is hard, costs money, 
depends on the carrier and phone, and is sometimes impossible. 
In some cases as well, blocking was impossible due to 
government issued phones. (p.419) 
(Freed et al., 2017) Monitoring tools (i.e. anti-theft software, activate 
or deactivate services) 
Many clients reported sharing a cellular family plan, with their 
abuser as the account manager for the plan. In this situation, the 
abuser is in fact the legal owner of the client’s account (and any 
children’s accounts) and can track the devices using anti-theft 
software, activate or deactivate services, and view billing 
information containing details of any calls, texts, or charges made 
to the account. (p.9) 
One prevalent category of apps that came up a lot in our data 
were tracking apps, ranging from child-monitoring apps for 
parents to anti-theft apps like Find my iPhone, all of which are 
commonly used by abusers to monitor clients. With simple 
Internet searches yielding a vast amount of information on how 
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to abuse—and providing access to tools that facilitate abuse. 
(p.10) 
(Matthews et al., 2017) Spyware  For example, after P2 found spyware on her phone and laptop, 
she said: “I simply stopped using the laptop at home. And the 
phone. That's why I went to the library to use the computer.” 
Her abuser had installed spyware on it, and she wasn’t 
convinced that it was clean after she reset it (p.2196) 
(Woodlock, 2017) Spyware  “I suspect he may have installed software onto my iPhone 
enabling him to have access to my phone calls, text messages, 
Facebook, e-mails, etc. He sometimes says things or behaves in 
ways that suggests he knows something via a suspicious means. 
(p.593) 
 
Table B. Search strategies 
Databases  Search terms 
  
Medline (OVID) 
& 
HMIC 
1. exp Domestic Violence/  
2. (domestic abuse or domestic violence).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading 
word, keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique 
identifier, synonyms]  
3. (intimate partner abuse or intimate partner violence).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject 
heading word, keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, 
unique identifier, synonyms]  
4. Stalking/  
5. exp Spouse Abuse/  
6. exp Intimate Partner Violence/  
7. coercive control.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
8. Battered Women/  
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9. (abus$ adj3 wom#n).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
10. (abus$ adj3 spous$).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
11. (abus$ adj3 partner$).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
12. (partner$ adj3 violen$).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
13. (spous$ adj3 violen$).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
14. (domestic adj3 (abus$ or violen$)).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, 
synonyms]  
15. (relationship$ adj3 violen$).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, 
synonyms]  
16. (intimate adj3 violen$).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
17. (gender adj3 violence).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
18. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17  
19. INTERNET/  
20. (online adj3 surveillance).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
21. (internet adj3 surveillance).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
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22. (online adj3 harass*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
23. (internet adj3 harass*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
24. (online adj3 abus*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
25. (internet adj3 abus*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
26. (cyberabuse or cyber-abuse or cyber abuse).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject 
heading word, keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, 
unique identifier, synonyms]  
27. (cyberstalk* or cyber-stalk or cyber stalk*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading 
word, keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique 
identifier, synonyms]  
28. ((facebook or social media) adj3 stalk*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading 
word, keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique 
identifier, synonyms]  
29. (online adj3 victim*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
30. (internet adj3 victim*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
31. (online adj3 stalk*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
32. (internet adj3 stalk*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
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33. digital technolog*.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
34. (internet adj3 safe*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
35. (online adj3 safe*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
36. technology safety project.mp.  
37. computerized decision support.mp.  
38. exp Social Media/  
39. "Cell Phone Use"/  
40. (digital adj3 abus*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
41. social media.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
42. (identity adj3 conceal*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
43. (identity adj3 hid*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
44. (cyber-relationship or cyber relationship).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading 
word, keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique 
identifier, synonyms]  
45. (monitor adj3 online).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
46. (monitor adj3 internet).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
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47. (online adj3 privacy).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
48. (internet adj3 privacy).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
49. human computer interaction.mp.  
50. technology-facilitat*.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
51. (profile adj3 conceal*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
52. (profile adj3 hid*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
53. social network*.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
54. (internet adj3 communicat*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, 
synonyms]  
55. (online adj3 communicat*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
56. (digital adj3 communicat*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
57. pseudonymous.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
58. anonymous identit*.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
59. (digital device or phone or laptop or computer or tablet).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, 
subject heading word, keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept 
word, unique identifier, synonyms]  
60. (password manager or encrypt*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier, 
synonyms]  
61. 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 
40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 54 or 55 or 56 or 57 or 58 or 59 or 60  
62. 18 and 61 
ASSIA ((domestic abus*) OR (domestic violen*) OR (intimate partner abus*) OR (intimate partner violen*) OR (coercive control) 
OR (spous* abus*) OR (spous* violen*) OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Domestic violence")) AND ab(facebook OR (social 
media) OR (digital technolog*) OR (digital device) OR phone OR laptop OR computer OR tablet OR (password manager) 
OR encrypt OR pseudonymous OR (anonymous identit*) OR (cyberabuse OR cyber-abuse OR cyber abuse) OR (cyberstalk* 
OR cyber-stalk OR cyber stalk*) OR (computerized decision support) OR (technolog* safety)) OR ab(internet NEAR/3 
(surveillance OR harass* OR abus* OR victim OR stalk* OR safe* OR monitor OR privacy OR conceal* OR communicat*)) 
OR ab(online NEAR/3 (surveillance OR harass* OR abus* OR victim OR stalk* OR safe* OR monitor OR privacy OR 
conceal* OR communicat*)) 
PsycInfo S65 S17 AND S63 
S64 S17 AND S63 
S63 S18 OR S19 OR S20 OR S21 OR S22 OR S23 OR S24 OR S25 OR S26 OR S27 OR S28 OR S29 OR S30 OR S31 
OR S32 OR S33 OR S34 OR S35 OR S36 OR S37 OR S38 OR S39 OR S40 OR S41 OR S42 OR S43 OR S44 OR S45 OR 
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S46 OR S47 OR S48 OR S49 OR S50 OR S51 OR S52 OR S53 OR S54 OR S55 OR S56 OR S57 OR S58 OR S59 OR S60 
OR S61 OR S62 
S62 password manager or encrypt* 
S61 anonymous identit* 
S60 digital device or phone or laptop or computer or tablet 
S59 anonymous identit 
S58 DE "Anonymity" 
S57 pseudonymous 
S56 digital N3 communicat* 
S55 online N3 communicat* 
S54 internet N3 communicat* 
S53 social network* 
S52 profile N3 hid* 
S51 profile N3 conceal* 
S50 technology-facilitat* 
S49 DE "Human Computer Interaction" 
S48 internet N3 privacy 
S47 online N3 privacy 
S46 monitor N3 internet 
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
S45 monitor N3 online 
S44 cyber-relationship or cyber relationship 
S43 identity N3 hid* 
S42 identity N3 conceal* 
S41 computerized decision support 
S40 DE "Decision Support Systems" 
S39 technology safety project 
S38 online N3 safe* 
S37 internet N3 safe* 
S36 digital technolog* 
S35 internet N3 stalk* 
S34 online N3 stalk* 
S33 internet N3 victim* 
S32 online N3 victim* 
S31 ((facebook or social media) N3 stalk*) 
S30 cyberstalk* or cyber-stalk or cyber stalk* 
S29 cyberabuse or cyber-abuse or cyber abuse 
S28 internet N3 abus* 
S27 online N3 abus* 
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S26 internet N3 harass* 
S25 online N3 harass* 
S24 internet N3 surveillance 
S23 online N3 surveillance 
S22 DE "Social Media" 
S21 DE "Online Community" 
S20 DE "Online Social Networks" 
S19 DE "Internet Usage" 
S18 DE "Internet" 
S17 S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR S4 OR S5 OR S6 OR S7 OR S8 OR S9 OR S10 OR S11 OR S12 OR S13 OR S14 OR S15 
OR S16 
S16 gender N3 violence 
S15 intimate N3 violence 
S14 relationship N3 (abus* or violence) 
S13 domestic N3 (abus* or violence) 
S12 spous* N3 violence 
S11 violence N3 partner 
S10 abus* N3 partner* 
S9 abus* N3 spous* 
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
S8 DE "Battered Females" 
S7 coercive control 
S6 DE "Partner Abuse" 
S5 DE "Stalking" 
S4 intimate partner abuse or intimate partner violence 
S3 domestic abuse or domestic violence 
S2 DE "Intimate Partner Violence" 
S1 DE "Domestic Violence" 
ACM Digital Library Search 1: (+domestic +abuse) 
Search 2: (+domestic +violence) 
Search 3: (+intimate partner +violence) 
Search 4: (+intimate partner +abuse) 
Search 5: (+spouse +abuse) 
Search 5: (+spouse +violence) 
Search 6: (+stalk +partner) 
Search 7: (+stalk +spouse) 
Search 8: cyberstalk 
Search 9: (+harass +partner) 
Search 10: (+harass +spouse) 
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Social Science Citation Index  
(via Web of Science) 
 
TS = (((domestic abus*) OR (domestic violen*) OR (intimate partner abus*) OR (intimate partner violen*) OR (coercive 
control) OR (spous* abus*) OR (spous* violen*) OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Domestic violence")) AND ab(facebook 
OR (social media) OR (digital technolog*) OR (digital device) OR phone OR laptop OR computer OR tablet OR (password 
manager) OR encrypt OR pseudonymous OR (anonymous identit*) OR (cyberabuse OR cyber-abuse OR cyber abuse) OR 
(cyberstalk* OR cyber-stalk OR cyber stalk*) OR (computerized decision support) OR (technolog* safety)) OR ab(internet 
NEAR/3 (surveillance OR harass* OR abus* OR victim OR stalk* OR safe* OR monitor OR privacy OR conceal* OR 
communicat*)) OR ab(online NEAR/3 (surveillance OR harass* OR abus* OR victim OR stalk* OR safe* OR monitor OR 
privacy OR conceal* OR communicat*))) AND TOPIC: ((facebook) OR (social media) OR (digital technolog*) OR (digital 
device) OR phone OR laptop OR computer OR tablet OR (password manager) OR encrypt OR pseudonymous OR 
(anonymous identit*) OR (cyberabuse OR cyber-abuse OR cyber abuse) OR (cyberstalk* OR cyber-stalk OR cyber stalk*) 
OR (computerized decision support) OR (technolog* safety)) OR TOPIC: ((internet NEAR/3 (surveillance OR harass* OR 
abus* OR victim OR stalk* OR safe* OR privacy OR conceal*))) OR TOPIC: ((online NEAR/3 (surveillance OR harass* 
OR abus* OR victim OR stalk* OR safe* OR privacy OR conceal*))) 
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Tables C1-C2. Quality Assessment 
Table C1. CASP Tool 
 No of studies scoring YES No of studies scoring NO No of studies scoring UNCLEAR 
1. Was there a clear statement 
of the aims of the research?  
9 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} 1 { ADDIN EN.CITE 
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Freed</Autho
r><Year>2017</Year><RecNum>86</Re
cNum><DisplayText>(Freed et al., 
2017)</DisplayText><record><rec-
number>86</rec-number><foreign-
keys><key app="EN" db-
id="99wepdz2q9tsvkewszavwavndxx2d5
wzvv2x" 
timestamp="1538156636">86</key></for
eign-keys><ref-type name="Journal 
Article">17</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Fr
eed, D.</author><author>Palmer, 
J.</author><author>Minchala, D. 
E.</author><author>Levy, 
K.</author><author>Ristenpart, 
T.</author><author>Dell, 
N.</author></authors></contributors><titl
es><title>Digital Technologies and 
Intimate Partner Violence: A Qualitative 
Analysis with Multiple 
Stakeholders</title><secondary-
title>Journal Proceedings of the ACM on 
Human-Computer Interaction</secondary-
title></titles><periodical><full-
title>Journal Proceedings of the ACM on 
Human-Computer Interaction</full-
title></periodical><pages>1-
22</pages><volume>1</volume><numbe
r>CSCW</number><dates><year>2017</
year></dates><isbn>2573-
0142</isbn><urls></urls><custom1>3134
681</custom1><electronic-resource-
num>10.1145/3134681</electronic-
resource-
num></record></Cite></EndNote>} 
- 
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2. Is a qualitative methodology 
appropriate?  
10 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} - - 
3. Was the research design 
appropriate to address the aims 
of the research?  
4 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} - 6 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
4. Was the recruitment strategy 
appropriate to the aims of the 
research?  
9 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} 1 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
- 
5. Was the data collected in a 
way that addressed the 
research issue? 
6 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} 1 { ADDIN EN.CITE 
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Tarzia</Auth
or><Year>2017</Year><RecNum>89</R
ecNum><DisplayText>(Tarzia et al., 
2017)</DisplayText><record><rec-
number>89</rec-number><foreign-
keys><key app="EN" db-
id="99wepdz2q9tsvkewszavwavndxx2d5
wzvv2x" 
timestamp="1538156743">89</key></for
eign-keys><ref-type name="Journal 
Article">17</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Ta
rzia, L.</author><author>Iyer, 
D.</author><author>Thrower, 
E.</author><author>Hegarty, 
K.</author></authors></contributors><au
th-address>Tarzia, Laura, Department of 
General Practice, University of 
Melbourne, 200 Berkeley Street, Carlton, 
VIC, Australia, 3053</auth-
address><titles><title>&apos;Technology 
doesn’t judge you&apos;: Young 
Australian women’s views on using the 
Internet and smartphones to address 
intimate partner 
violence</title><secondary-title>Journal 
of Technology in Human 
Services</secondary-
title></titles><periodical><full-
title>Journal of Technology in Human 
Services</full-
title></periodical><pages>199-
218</pages><volume>35</volume><num
ber>3</number><keywords><keyword>E
3 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
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-health</keyword><keyword>intimate 
partner 
violence</keyword><keyword>online 
intervention</keyword><keyword>theory 
of planned 
behavior</keyword><keyword>young 
women</keyword><keyword>Health 
Care 
Delivery</keyword><keyword>Reasoned 
Action</keyword><keyword>Intervention
</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2
017</year></dates><pub-location>United 
Kingdom</pub-
location><publisher>Taylor &amp; 
Francis</publisher><isbn>1522-
8835&#xD;1522-8991</isbn><accession-
num>2017-49244-003</accession-
num><urls><related-
urls><url>http://search.ebscohost.com/log
in.aspx?direct=true&amp;db=psyh&amp;
AN=2017-49244-003&amp;site=ehost-
live</url><url>ORCID: 0000-0002-7532-
5147</url><url>laura.tarzia@unimelb.edu
.au</url></related-
urls></urls><electronic-resource-
num>10.1080/15228835.2017.1350616</e
lectronic-resource-num><remote-
database-name>psyh</remote-database-
name><remote-database-
provider>EBSCOhost</remote-database-
provider></record></Cite></EndNote>} 
6. Has the relationship between 
researcher and participants 
been adequately considered?  
2 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} 7 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
1 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
7. Have ethical issues been 
taken into consideration? 
7 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} - 3 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
8. Was the data analysis 
sufficiently rigorous?  
9 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} - 1 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
9. Is there a clear statement of 
findings?  
8 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} 1 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
1 { ADDIN EN.CITE 
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Dimond
</Author><Year>2011</Year><Rec
Num>16</RecNum><DisplayText>
(Dimond et al., 
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2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-
number>16</rec-number><foreign-
keys><key app="EN" db-
id="99wepdz2q9tsvkewszavwavndx
x2d5wzvv2x" 
timestamp="1537815082">16</key
></foreign-keys><ref-type 
name="Journal Article">17</ref-
type><contributors><authors><auth
or>Dimond, J. 
P.</author><author>Fiesler, 
C.</author><author>Bruckman, A. 
S.</author></authors></contributors
><auth-address>Georgia Inst 
Technol, Sch Interact Comp, 
Atlanta, GA 30332 USA</auth-
address><titles><title>Domestic 
violence and information 
communication 
technologies</title><secondary-
title>Interacting with 
Computers</secondary-title><alt-
title>Interact Comput</alt-
title></titles><periodical><full-
title>Interacting with 
Computers</full-title><abbr-
1>Interact Comput</abbr-
1></periodical><alt-
periodical><full-title>Interacting 
with Computers</full-title><abbr-
1>Interact Comput</abbr-1></alt-
periodical><pages>413-
421</pages><volume>23</volume>
<number>5</number><keywords><
keyword>feminist 
hci</keyword><keyword>privacy</
keyword><keyword>social 
computing</keyword><keyword>m
obile 
phones</keyword><keyword>dome
stic 
violence</keyword><keyword>cybe
rstalking</keyword></keywords><d
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ates><year>2011</year><pub-
dates><date>Sep</date></pub-
dates></dates><isbn>0953-
5438</isbn><accession-
num>WOS:000297871400005</acc
ession-num><urls><related-
urls><url>&lt;Go to 
ISI&gt;://WOS:000297871400005</
url></related-
urls></urls><electronic-resource-
num>10.1016/j.intcom.2011.04.006
</electronic-resource-
num><language>English</language
></record></Cite></EndNote>} 
10. How valuable is the 
research?  
9 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA }} 1 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
- 
 
Table C2. AXIS Tool 
 No of studies scoring YES No of studies scoring NO No of studies scoring UNCLEAR 
Introduction 
1. Were the aims/objectives of the study 
clear? 
8 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
2 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
1 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
Methods 
2. Was the study design appropriate for the 
stated aim(s)? 
10 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
1 { ADDIN EN.CITE 
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Truman</Auth
or><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>95</Re
cNum><DisplayText>(Truman, 
2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-
number>95</rec-number><foreign-
keys><key app="EN" db-
id="99wepdz2q9tsvkewszavwavndxx2d5w
zvv2x" 
timestamp="1538157797">95</key></forei
gn-keys><ref-type name="Thesis">32</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Tru
man, Jennifer 
Lynn</author></authors></contributors><t
itles><title>Examining intimate partner 
stalking and use of technology in stalking 
victimization</title><alt-title>Dissertation 
Abstracts International Section A: 
Humanities and Social Sciences</alt-
- 
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title></titles><pages>3049-
3049</pages><volume>71</volume><key
words><keyword>intimate partner 
stalking</keyword><keyword>technology<
/keyword><keyword>stalking 
victimization</keyword><keyword>Intimat
e Partner 
Violence</keyword><keyword>Partner 
Abuse</keyword><keyword>Stalking</key
word><keyword>Victimization</keyword>
</keywords><dates><year>2011</year></
dates><pub-location>US</pub-
location><publisher>ProQuest Information 
&amp; Learning</publisher><isbn>0419-
4209&#xD;978-1-124-09228-
7</isbn><accession-num>2011-99030-
134</accession-num><urls><related-
urls><url>http://search.ebscohost.com/logi
n.aspx?direct=true&amp;db=psyh&amp;A
N=2011-99030-134&amp;site=ehost-
live</url></related-urls></urls><remote-
database-name>psyh</remote-database-
name><remote-database-
provider>EBSCOhost</remote-database-
provider></record></Cite></EndNote>} 
3. Was the sample size justified? 1 { ADDIN EN.CITE 
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Truman</Au
thor><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>95
</RecNum><DisplayText>(Truman, 
2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-
number>95</rec-number><foreign-
keys><key app="EN" db-
id="99wepdz2q9tsvkewszavwavndxx2d5
wzvv2x" 
timestamp="1538157797">95</key></fo
reign-keys><ref-type 
name="Thesis">32</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>T
ruman, Jennifer 
Lynn</author></authors></contributors>
<titles><title>Examining intimate partner 
stalking and use of technology in stalking 
victimization</title><alt-
10 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
- 
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
title>Dissertation Abstracts International 
Section A: Humanities and Social 
Sciences</alt-
title></titles><pages>3049-
3049</pages><volume>71</volume><ke
ywords><keyword>intimate partner 
stalking</keyword><keyword>technolog
y</keyword><keyword>stalking 
victimization</keyword><keyword>Inti
mate Partner 
Violence</keyword><keyword>Partner 
Abuse</keyword><keyword>Stalking</k
eyword><keyword>Victimization</keyw
ord></keywords><dates><year>2011</y
ear></dates><pub-location>US</pub-
location><publisher>ProQuest 
Information &amp; 
Learning</publisher><isbn>0419-
4209&#xD;978-1-124-09228-
7</isbn><accession-num>2011-99030-
134</accession-num><urls><related-
urls><url>http://search.ebscohost.com/lo
gin.aspx?direct=true&amp;db=psyh&am
p;AN=2011-99030-134&amp;site=ehost-
live</url></related-urls></urls><remote-
database-name>psyh</remote-database-
name><remote-database-
provider>EBSCOhost</remote-database-
provider></record></Cite></EndNote>} 
4. Was the target/reference population clearly 
defined? (Is it clear who the research was 
about? 
7 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
2 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
2 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
5. Was the sample frame taken from an 
appropriate population base so that it closely 
represented the target/reference population 
under investigation? 
5 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
6 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
- 
6. Was the selection process likely to select 
subjects/participants that were representative 
of the target/reference population under 
investigation? 
1 { ADDIN EN.CITE 
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Truman</Au
thor><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>95
</RecNum><DisplayText>(Truman, 
2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-
number>95</rec-number><foreign-
keys><key app="EN" db-
6 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
4 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
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id="99wepdz2q9tsvkewszavwavndxx2d5
wzvv2x" 
timestamp="1538157797">95</key></fo
reign-keys><ref-type 
name="Thesis">32</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>T
ruman, Jennifer 
Lynn</author></authors></contributors>
<titles><title>Examining intimate partner 
stalking and use of technology in stalking 
victimization</title><alt-
title>Dissertation Abstracts International 
Section A: Humanities and Social 
Sciences</alt-
title></titles><pages>3049-
3049</pages><volume>71</volume><ke
ywords><keyword>intimate partner 
stalking</keyword><keyword>technolog
y</keyword><keyword>stalking 
victimization</keyword><keyword>Inti
mate Partner 
Violence</keyword><keyword>Partner 
Abuse</keyword><keyword>Stalking</k
eyword><keyword>Victimization</keyw
ord></keywords><dates><year>2011</y
ear></dates><pub-location>US</pub-
location><publisher>ProQuest 
Information &amp; 
Learning</publisher><isbn>0419-
4209&#xD;978-1-124-09228-
7</isbn><accession-num>2011-99030-
134</accession-num><urls><related-
urls><url>http://search.ebscohost.com/lo
gin.aspx?direct=true&amp;db=psyh&am
p;AN=2011-99030-134&amp;site=ehost-
live</url></related-urls></urls><remote-
database-name>psyh</remote-database-
name><remote-database-
provider>EBSCOhost</remote-database-
provider></record></Cite></EndNote>} 
7. Were measures undertaken to address and 
categorise non-responders? 
- 11 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
- 
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
8. Were the risk factor and outcome variables 
measured appropriate to the aims of the 
study? 
10 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
- 1 { ADDIN EN.CITE 
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Chaul
k</Author><Year>2011</Year><
RecNum>97</RecNum><Display
Text>(Chaulk and Jones, 
2011)</DisplayText><record><re
c-number>97</rec-
number><foreign-keys><key 
app="EN" db-
id="99wepdz2q9tsvkewszavwavn
dxx2d5wzvv2x" 
timestamp="1538158008">97</ke
y></foreign-keys><ref-type 
name="Journal Article">17</ref-
type><contributors><authors><au
thor>Chaulk, 
Kasey</author><author>Jones, 
Tim</author></authors></contrib
utors><titles><title>Online 
Obsessive Relational Intrusion: 
Further Concerns About 
Facebook</title><secondary-
title>Journal of Family 
Violence</secondary-
title></titles><periodical><full-
title>Journal of Family 
Violence</full-
title></periodical><pages>245-
254</pages><volume>26</volum
e><number>4</number><keywor
ds><keyword>Criminology And 
Law 
Enforcement</keyword><keywor
d>Web 
sites</keyword><keyword>Social 
networks</keyword><keyword>S
talking</keyword><keyword>Stu
dent 
behavior</keyword><keyword>C
omputer 
privacy</keyword></keywords><
dates><year>2011</year><pub-
dates><date>May 
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2011&#xD;2014-08-
22</date></pub-
dates></dates><pub-
location>New York</pub-
location><publisher>Springer 
Science &amp; Business 
Media</publisher><isbn>0885748
2</isbn><accession-
num>862796909</accession-
num><urls><related-
urls><url>https://search.proquest.
com/docview/862796909?account
id=145964</url><url>https://nhs-
scot-
primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/o
penurl/44NHSS_INST/44NHSS_I
NST_services_page?sid=heh&am
p;volume=26&amp;atitle=Online+
Obsessive+Relational+Intrusion%
3A+Further+Concerns+About+Fa
cebook&amp;date=2011&amp;sp
age=245&amp;issn=08857482&a
mp;genre=article&amp;issue=4&a
mp;title=Online+Obsessive+Relati
onal+Intrusion%3A+Further+Con
cerns+About+Facebook&amp;aul
ast=Chaulk&amp;isbn=</url></re
lated-urls></urls><electronic-
resource-num>10.1007/s10896-
011-9360-x</electronic-resource-
num><remote-database-
name>Social Services 
Abstracts</remote-database-
name><language>English</langu
age></record></Cite></EndNote>
} 
9. Were the risk factor and outcome variables 
measured correctly using 
instruments/measurements that had been 
trialled, piloted or published previously? 
6 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
5 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
- 
10. Is it clear what was used to determined 
statistical significance and/or precision 
5 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
1 { ADDIN EN.CITE 
<EndNote><Cite><Author>Truman</Auth
or><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>95</Re
5 { ADDIN EN.CITE { ADDIN 
EN.CITE.DATA }} 
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estimates? (e.g. p-values, confidence 
intervals) 
cNum><DisplayText>(Truman, 
2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-
number>95</rec-number><foreign-
keys><key app="EN" db-
id="99wepdz2q9tsvkewszavwavndxx2d5w
zvv2x" 
timestamp="1538157797">95</key></forei
gn-keys><ref-type name="Thesis">32</ref-
type><contributors><authors><author>Tru
man, Jennifer 
Lynn</author></authors></contributors><t
itles><title>Examining intimate partner 
stalking and use of technology in stalking 
victimization</title><alt-title>Dissertation 
Abstracts International Section A: 
Humanities and Social Sciences</alt-
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